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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays, two on estimating dynamic entry games and one
on the inference for misspecified models with fixed regressors.
Big box retail stores have large impact on local economies and receive large subsidies
from local governments. Hence it is important to understand how discount retail chains
choose store locations. In the first two essays, I study the entry decisions of those firms,
examine the role of preemptive incentives, and evaluate the impact of government subsidies
on those decisions. To quantify preemptive incentives, I model firms’ entry decisions using
a dynamic duopoly location game. Stores compete over the shopping-dollars of close-by
consumers, making store profitability spatially interdependent. I use separability and two-
stage budgeting to reduce the state space of the game and make the model tractable. Instead
of adopting census geographic units, I infer market divisions from data using a clustering
algorithm built on separability conditions. I introduce a ‘rolling window’ approximation to
compute the value function and estimate the parameters of the game. The results suggest
that preemptive incentives are important in chain stores’ location decisions and that they
lead to loss of production efficiency. On average, the combined sum of current and future
profits of the two firms is lowered by 1 million dollars per store. Finally, I assess the impact
of government subsidies to encourage entry when one retailer exits, as happened in the
recent crisis. I find that although the welfare loss such exits cause on local economies
can be substantial, the average size of observed subsidies is not enough to affect firms’
entry decisions. This study is organized as follows. In the first essay, I provide descriptive
evidence of preemptive entry in the discount retail industry and explain how I model firms’
iii
entry decisions. In the second essay, I describe the estimation strategy and present the
counterfactual analyses.
The third essay is joint work with Alberto Abadie and Guido Imbens. Following the work
by Eicker (1967), Huber (1967) and White (1980ab; 1982) it is common in empirical work to
report standard errors that are robust against general misspecification. In a regression setting
these standard errors are valid for the parameter that minimizes the squared difference
between the conditional expectation and the linear approximation, averaged over the
population distribution of the covariates. In this essay, we discuss an alternative parameter
that corresponds to the approximation to the conditional expectation based on minimization
of the squared difference averaged over the sample, rather than the population, distribution
of the covariates. We argue that in some cases this may be a more interesting parameter.
We derive the asymptotic variance for this parameter, which is generally smaller than the
Eicker-Huber-White robust variance, and propose a consistent estimator for this asymptotic
variance.
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Chapter 1
Spatial Competition and Preemptive
Entry in the Discount Retail Industry:
Descriptive Evidence and Model
1.1 Introduction
The discount retail industry has been a fast growing sector of the U.S. economy since
the 1960s. Back in 1962, only three small chains existed with less than 200 stores in total.
Today, there are many more national chains with over 5000 stores in the country, generating
revenue of over a hundred billion dollars per year. Such fast growth has had a large impact
on local economies. On the one hand, consumers benefit from the low prices and product
varieties of stores such as Walmart and Kmart. New stores of discount retailers also boost
local employment. However, small businesses and other retailers suffer from the presence
of discount retailers (Jia, 2008). Overall local employment rates may be lower due to entry
by a discount retailer (Basker, 2007; Neumark et al., 2008). Employees criticize firms such
as Walmart for driving down wages and benefits (Basker, 2007). In small towns, residents
complain about dying main streets and business centers. These studies show that discount
retailer’s entry has a large impact on local economies.
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Multi-store retail chains are also receiving large amounts of subsidies from local gov-
ernments in the form of sales tax rebate, property tax rebate, infrastructure assistance, etc..
Walmart alone received over 160 million dollars in the past 15 years1. Local economies
are affected as much by store closings as by store openings, as shown by Kmart closing
over 1000 stores in the wake of the recent crisis2. Local governments are proposing to
subsidize other retailers to replace closing stores. However, most of the abandoned retail
space, such as the former Kmart stores, has remained empty for years3. Whether subsidies
affect discount retailers’ entry decisions and more generally how the firms make entry
decisions thus become an important question for policy makers. The first goal of this study
is to study how multi-store retail chains such as Walmart and Kmart make entry decisions.
To answer this question, I use a data set about two discount retailers. Both retailers are
among the largest in the country. Since part of the data is proprietary, I am not able to reveal
the identities of the firms. In what follows, I will refer to them as Blue firm and Red firm.
The two firms were among the first to open discount stores in the U.S. and both experienced
long periods of fast growth. Blue firm was much smaller than Red firm before the 1980s,
but surpassed Red firm in the early 1990s and became one of the largest employers in the
country. Blue firm succeeded in competing against Red firm because it carefully chose store
locations, exploited economies of density and, most interestingly, possibly made preemptive
entry moves (Bradley et al., 2002; Holmes, 2011). That is, Blue firm might have entered
earlier in markets in which it feared Red firm would enter. As a consequence, the second
goal of this study is to investigate preemptive incentives and to quantify their impact on
multi-store retailers’ entry decisions and on the production efficiency of opening new stores.
The definition of preemptive entry I will follow hinges on how much (in equilibrium) the
likelihood of one firm entering a particular location today is impacted by the likelihood of
its opponent entering the same location in the future, holding its static profits constant.
1Source: goodjobfirst.org.
2Source: Kmart annual reports.
3Source: http://www.floridatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/27/
kmart-goes-next/13197001/
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The data I use consists of two major parts. The first part contains store level sales data
and consumer demographic data, which will be used in the demand estimation. The second
part is firms’ entry data which contains geocoded store locations and store opening dates of
each Blue and Red store opened between 1985 and 2001. Blue firm’s entry data comes from
Holmes (2011). I collected Red firm’s entry data using various sources including yellow
page data and industry journals.
The model through which I analyze my data has two main features. First, it allows
strategic interactions between firms in a dynamic duopoly framework. This is necessary
because preemptive incentives cannot be studied in either a dynamic single-agent or a
static game setting. Second, stores are spatially interdependent through demand and the
firm-level entry decisions. This last feature fits the nature of the discount retail industry,
since firms operate multiple stores that often locate close to each other. It also applies
to other retail industries or markets in which firms operate in multiple interdependent
locations or sectors.
As in many empirical models of dynamic games, a major obstacle to estimation is
computing the value function for a large number of possible choice paths. The problem is
particularly difficult to solve in the current setting given that entry decisions are made at
the firm level and that decisions are not independent across markets. Therefore, I develop a
series of tools to make the model tractable.
First, I apply two-stage budgeting and separability conditions to decentralize firms’
entry decisions across markets. Conditional on optimal market-level budget, if markets are
separable, entry decisions become optimal within each market. This allows me to condition
on the observed budget constraint of each market and solve the game for each market
independently. Then, I build a clustering algorithm based on the separability conditions
and apply it to partition the national market, while preserving the spatial interdependence
across stores within each market. Finally, I employ a ‘rolling window’ approximation to
compute value functions. That is, instead of optimizing over an infinite horizon, firms
optimize over a fixed number of periods ahead and approximate the continuation value
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using scaled terminal values. The set of potential paths of choices each firm is optimizing
over is therefore restricted, but the approximation is consistent with how managers actually
make decisions. Due to the non-stationary nature of the problem at hand, the dynamic
game cannot be estimated in a two-stage procedure as in (Bajari et al., 2007) (BBL) or Pakes
et al. (2007) (POB). Accordingly, I solve for the nested fixed point in the estimation as in
Pakes (1986) and Rust (1987). The parameter estimates are obtained by solving the game
using backwards induction and maximizing the likelihood of observed location choices in
each market and each period.
Using the estimated parameters, I conduct counterfactual analyses to quantify preemp-
tive incentives and to evaluate subsidy policies. The first counterfactual analysis quantifies
preemptive incentives by removing them from one firm’s optimization problem and com-
paring it to the original equilibrium. The challenge is that preemption is a motive instead of
an action and thus it is difficult to be distinguished from other optimization motives in the
entry decision. Accordingly, I use a one-period deviation approach to identify preemption.
The preemptive motives of Blue firm are removed from the optimization motives of its
entry decision by taking Blue firm’s observed choices out of Red firm’s choice set for one
period. The reasoning is as follows: if Blue firm chose the observed locations in the current
period because it feared Red firm would enter otherwise, Blue firm should delay entry at
those locations now, since Red firm is not allowed to enter in the following period. Results
show that preemption costs Blue firm 0.86 million dollars per store on average, which is
equivalent to a small store’s one year profits. The combined current and future profits of
the two firms increase by 397 million dollars when preemption is removed, which is about 1
million dollars per store. The findings thus suggest that preemptive incentives are important
to multi-store retailers’ entry decisions and that preemptive entry can lead to substantial
production efficiency loss.
In a second counterfactual analysis, I evaluate the subsidy policies proposed by local
governments to encourage entry by Blue firm during a period in which Red firm exited
many markets. I find that the average level of subsidies is not enough to induce entry and
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that preemptive incentives affect the level of subsidies Blue firm needs to enter. Finally, I
compute consumer welfare loss from longer travel time to shops when a Red store closes. I
find that the welfare loss can be as big as the average size of the observed subsidies Blue
firm received in the past.
This study contributes to a literature studying the discount retail industry. Holmes (2011)
showed the importance of economies of scale in Walmart’s expansion, using a single-agent
dynamic optimization model. Jia (2008) studied the impact of Walmart and Kmart on small
business, by solving a static game between Walmart and Kmart. Ellickson et al. (2013) and
Zhu and Singh (2009) also studied economies of scale and competition between big chains,
in a static setting. This study complements the literature by presenting a dynamic duopoly
model to investigate the dynamic strategic interactions between firms while preserving
features such as economies of scale and spatial competition that the papers mentioned above
studied. In addition, the modeling and estimating methods in this paper make it possible
to conduct counterfactual analyses to quantify preemptive incentives and evaluate subsidy
policies.
The entry literature has been pioneered by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992).
In most of the literature, for example in Mazzeo (2002) and in Seim (2006), firms make
independent entry decisions in each market. In this paper by contrast, entry decisions
are made at the firm level and markets are spatially interdependent. Jia (2008) allows
interdependence across entry decisions, but the interdependence is assumed to be positive
and linear in store density. More general forms of interdependence are allowed in this paper.
They are also explicitly modeled through demand and firm level budget constraints.
This study also contributes to a recent empirical literature on preemptive incentives.
Schmidt-Dengler (2006) studied preemptive incentives in the adoption of MRI by hospitals.
He identifies preemptive incentives by solving a pre-commitment game and comparing the
result to the original equilibrium in which players are allowed to respond to the opponent’s
action in each period. Igami and Yang (2014) examine burger chains’ preemptive entry
decisions, by solving a single agent’s dynamic optimization problem and comparing the
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results to the dynamic duopoly equilibrium. By contrast, this study introduces a one-
period deviation method to identify preemptive incentives, while allowing static strategic
interactions between firms and keeping payoffs comparable.
As for the theoretical tools used in the study, the two-stage budgeting and separability
results come from classic theorems by Gorman (1971) on consumption problems. This study
generalizes the main theorems in Gorman (1959, 1971), so that they can be applied in a
dynamic game setting. The clustering algorithm developed in the study is based on those
separability results. It belongs to the class of greedy algorithms of the graph partitioning
literature (Fortunato and Castellano, 2012). It is applicable to other graph partitioning or
market division problems in which geographic contiguity is preserved and precision of the
solution is preferred to speed.
The study is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the background of the industry
in more detail, describes the data and provides descriptive evidence of preemptive incentives.
Section 1.3 introduces the model, the application of two-stage budgeting and separability,
and explains how markets can be defined using machine learning tools. Chapter 2 presents
the empirical part of the study including the counterfactual analyses. Section 2.2 shows how
the value functions can be approximated and presents the estimation results. Counterfactuals
under which preemptive motives are removed are presented in Section 2.3. The subsidy
policy application is presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
1.2 Industry Background and Data
1.2.1 Discount Retail Industry: Background
The discount retail industry in the U.S. started when Walmart and Kmart opened their first
stores in 1962. It has been growing very fast in the following 40 years. The total sales of
discount stores peaked at 137 billion dollars in 2001 (Census, Annual Retail Trade Survey).
The discount retail industry is a very concentrated one. In 2002, the four largest firms
controlled 95% of sales (Census, Economic Census).
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Table 1.1: Comparison of Blue firm and Red firm in 2001
Blue Red
Number of stores 2698 1883
Number of distribution centers 35 18
The two firms this paper studies, Blue and Red firm, are among those four largest firms.
They followed the path of growth of the industry. Blue firm has had a particularly interesting
pattern of growth. It was very small at the beginning of the industry, with less than 300
stores in the 1980s when Red firm already had over 1000 stores. But it surpassed Red firm
in the 1990s and became one of the largest employers in the country. Table 1.1 presents
the total number of stores and distribution centers of Blue and Red firm in 2001. Blue
firm appears to be much bigger than Red firm in both dimensions. To explain Blue firm’s
success, researchers have highlighted carefully chosen store locations, efficient distribution
network, high store density, and economies of scale (Bradley et al., 2002; Holmes, 2011).
Since Blue and Red firm compete in the same market, it is natural to examine whether these
characteristics have also played a role in Blue firm’s surpassing Red firm. In his study of
economies of scale, Holmes (2011) raises the additional question of possible preemptive
entry - a topic this paper will be concerned with.
Discount retail stores are known to have a large impact on local economies. Consumers
benefit from the low prices of discount stores. Ellickson and Misra (2008) find that when
Walmart enters a market, its low prices extend to other local stores. Basker (2007) shows
that local employment is boosted after Walmart’s entry. The impact is not always positive,
however. Jia (2008) finds that half of the decline of small businesses in U.S. is caused by
entry of Walmart or Kmart during the 1980s and 1990s. Basker (2007) also shows that when
Walmart opens a new store, local employment shrinks in the long term due to the closings
of small businesses. Because of the large and complex impact of discount retailers on the
local economy, it is in the interest of policy makers to understand how decisions about
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where to locate stores are made - the issue this paper investigates.
Discount retailers also turn out to receive large amounts of subsidies from local gov-
ernments. According to goodjobsfirst.org, Walmart alone received over 160 million dollars
between 2000 and 2014. The subsidies take on various forms including sales tax rebate,
property tax rebate, free land, infrastructure assistance, etc.. Since Red firm started exiting
many markets in 2001, local governments have been proposing subsidies to Red firm so
that it would stay or to other retailers like Blue firm so that they would enter. For example,
Buffalo, NY, proposed a 400,000 dollar subsidy to Red firm for it to stays4. Lots of retail
space stayed empty for years. In Rockledge, FL, for example, the ex-Red store has been
empty for 11 years5. It is not clear if the proposed size of subsidies is big enough to affect
retailers’ entry decisions in general - a question this paper will assess.
1.2.2 Data
Data limitations of the discount retail industry heavily constrains the models that can be
used to analyze it. This is why I describe the data sources before presenting the model.
There are four main components of the data. The first component is store and dis-
tribution center locations and time of opening between 1985 and 2003. Blue firm’s store
and distribution center locations and opening dates between 1985 and 2003 come from
Holmes (2011). Red firm’s locations and time of opening data come from three sources. First,
addresses and time of store openings are from infoUSA in 20026. Second, I double-checked
the addresses and time of opening of each store using the annual Chain Store Guide between
1984 and 2001. This step was necessary because there are 96 Red closings after 2000, and
some of the stores are missing in the 2002 InfoUSA data. I do not model store closing
decisions in this paper, but in the policy application in Section 2.4, I will discuss entry after
4Source: www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/26/sears-closes-cities_n_1231326.html
5Source: www.floridatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/27/kmart-goes-next/
13197001/
6Red firm stopped opening stores after 2002.
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a store closure. The time of opening and closing of theses missing stores was collected by
searching through local newspapers7. Finally, I geocoded store addresses using the ArcGIS
North America Address Locator. The distribution center addresses of Red firm have been
collected from data published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)8. The
addresses have also been geocoded using ArcGIS, and opening dates have been collected
from local newspapers.
Figure 1.1 presents the store and distribution centers of Blue firm on the map of
contiguous U.S., as a snapshot by the end of 2001. The blue dots indicate Blue stores and
the green diamonds indicate Blue distribution centers. Figure 1.2 presents the stores and
distribution centers of Red firm by 2001. Each red dot is a Red store and each yellow
diamond is a Red distribution center. Comparing the two maps, it appears that Blue firm
has both more stores and more distribution centers, while Red stores seem to be more
concentrated geographically. The figures also show that both firms are national chains and
they compete in many local markets across the nation.
The sample consists of Blue and Red store openings between 1995 and 2001. 1984 and
1140 Blue and Red stores opened in this period, respectively. Store openings between 2002
and 2003 are left out of the sample because Red firm stopped opening new stores in 2002.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display the sample store openings by year. It appears that Blue firm
opened more stores than Red firm in almost every year9.
Table 1.2 provides the summary statistics of the characteristics of the sample by firm.
The characteristics are measured for the median store in 2001. First of all, it appears that the
median distance to the closest competitor’s store for Blue stores, 8.38 miles, is much bigger
than for Red ones, 3.46 miles. The difference suggests that Red stores face more competition
from Blue stores than Blue ones do from Red ones. Comparing this difference to the smaller
7For the 12 of Red stores that I could not find information about, I assumed the time of opening to be the
first quarter of the year it first appeared in Chain Store Guide, and the time of closing to be the first quarter of
the year they first disappeared.
8Distribution centers are EPA regulated facilities.
9The peak for Red firm in 1992 corresponds to the acquisition of a small chain. The stores belonging to the
small chain are not counted as entry but kept in the sample as “Red stores” after the acquisition.
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Figure 1.1: Blue stores and distribution centers in 2001
Figure 1.2: Red stores and distribution centers in 2001
10
Figure 1.3: Blue store openings by year 1985-2001
Figure 1.4: Red store openings by year 1985-2001
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Table 1.2: Location comparisons between two firms in sample period 1985-2001: median store characteristics
measured in 2001
Blue Red
distance to closest competitor’s store 8.38 3.46
std. dev. 20.11 11.22
distance to closest same firm’s store 11.90 10.16
std. dev. 15.12 20.79
total number of stores 1983 1140
number of same firm’s stores in 30mi 4 3
number of any stores in 30mi 7 9
population density (105) 1.04 8.16
std. dev.(105) 3.20 1.86
distance to distribution center 98.47 126.56
std. dev. 71.41 122.02
total number of distribution centers 35 18
difference between Blue’s median distance to the closest Blue firm, 11.90 miles, and that
of Red, 10.16 miles, it appears that Blue stores are more spread out than Red stores. The
number of any stores within 30 miles and population density around stores also indicate
that Red stores are located in more concentrated areas, in terms of both store density and
population density. Finally, Blue firm has 35 distribution centers while Red has 18. With
more distribution centers, Blue stores are on average about 40 miles closer to their own
distribution centers than Red stores to theirs. These differences, as will be discussed later,
are important in characterizing preemptive entry behavior.
The second component of the data is store level characteristics. The store level sales
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estimates and square footage of selling space of Blue and Red firm in 2007 come from the
Nielsen TDLinx data. The sales are estimated using multiple sources including self-reported
retailer input, store visits, questionnaires to store managers, etc.. They are regarded as the
best available store level sales data of the discount retail industry and as a consequence
they have been used by other researchers (Ellickson et al., 2013, Holmes, 2011). For stores
that sell both general merchandise and grocery, only sales of general merchandise are
included. Square footage of selling space is derived from actual property plans. Because
of the proprietary nature of this data set, I cannot present summary statistics of store
characteristics.
The third component of the data consists of demographic information, wage, rent, and
other information about the two firms. I use block group level demographic data in the 1980,
1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. A block group is a geographic unit that has a population
between 600 to 3000 people. The demographic information of each block group contains
total population, per capita income, share of African-American population, share of elderly
population (65 years old and above), and share of young population (21 and below). Table
1.3 presents the summary statistics of the block group level demographic information. Wage
data is constructed using average retail wage by county in the County Business Patterns
between 1985 and 2003. Rent data is created using the residential property value information
in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. I adopt the same method as in Holmes
(2011) to construct an index of property values. (See Appendix A of Holmes (2011) for
details.) Firms’ annual reports and interviews I conducted with managers and consultants
also provide supporting information. Goodjobfirst.org is a website that collects government
subsidy data published from various sources. The list of subsidies are incomplete, but it
gives an idea about the scale of the subsidies. It is the best data source of its kind. Shoag
and Veuger (2014) use this data in their study. I also interviewed a manager of Blue firm
and a former manager of Red firm. I use the information collected from those interviews to
choose between different modeling options, so that the model mimics how managers make
decisions in reality.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics of block group demographics
1980 1990 2000
mean population 0.83 1.11 1.35
mean income per capita 14.73 18.56 21.27
mean share African-American 0.10 0.13 0.13
mean share elderly 0.12 0.14 0.13
mean share young 0.35 0.31 0.31
no. of observations 269,738 222,764 206,960
source: U.S. census 1980, 1990, 2000
1.2.3 Descriptive Evidence of Preemptive Entry
In this section, I provide suggestive evidence of preemptive entry using reduced form
regressions. Preemption, in this context, refers to the entry by one firm in order to deter
entry by its opponent. More specifically, I define it as how much, in equilibrium, the
likelihood of one firm entering a particular location today is impacted by the likelihood of its
opponent entering the same location in the future, holding static profits constant. (A formal
definition will be given in Section 2.3.) Using descriptive data, three kinds of behavior
could be called preemption. First, a firm can open more stores than otherwise optimal, so
that the opponent cannot enter the market. Second, a firm can cluster its stores to deter
entry of the competitor. Finally, a firm can open a store earlier than otherwise optimal, so
that the competitor cannot enter. The first two types are hard to find evidence for using
reduced form regressions, since it is hard to separate store quantity and store density from
unobserved market profitability. Therefore, I focus on the timing of store opening. More
precisely, I choose to study Blue firm’s store opening time instead of Red firm’s, for two
reasons. First, Blue firm’s fast growth and high store density suggests it is more likely that
it engaged in preemption, as described in the previous section. Second, during the observed
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period of time, Blue firm has more observations of new stores openings than Red firm.
Next, I describe how preemptive incentives can be identified. The goal is to find a
location characteristic that 1) affects Red firm’s payoff of entering the location and therefore
Blue firm’s dynamic payoff if Blue firm does not enter the location in the current period,
2) does not affect Blue store’s static profits of entry in the current period, i.e. is not
correlated with unobserved market profitability. In other words, the impact of this location
characteristic on Blue store’s opening time should indicate how much the likelihood of Red
store’s entry affects Blue firm’s entry decision.
One variable satisfying these conditions is the distance between a Blue firm’s store and
the closest Red firm’s distribution center. The distance to the Red distribution center affects
Red firm’s payoff of locating a store, thus the likelihood of Red firm’s entry. On the other
hand, this distance does not directly impact Blue firm’s static profit of entry. The challenge
is that distribution centers are likely to be located close to potential stores, so that locations
of Red distribution centers can be correlated with unobserved market profitability in the
area. I include in the regression a control variable that approximates the unobserved market
profitability around each Red distribution center. The profitability is measured by the total
number of stores around the Red distribution center, including both Blue and Red stores, by
the end of the observed period10.
The Cox hazard model is applied to examine the impact of the distance to Red dis-
tribution center on Blue store’s opening time. The dependent variable is duration before
store opening for each Blue store l, measured in quarter. The observed time period is
between 1985 and 2001. The independent variable of interest is the distance between l and
the closest Red distribution center. Since Red firm was expanding its distribution center
network during the period of observation, the distance to Red distribution center is time
dependent. Thus each observation is a location l observed in period t. Let hlt be the store
10The underlying assumption in the analysis is that the unobserved market profitability that is correlated
with the locations of distribution centers does not fluctuate very much over time. This is likely to be true since
all distribution centers are located in very rural and remote areas where demographics did not change very
much over the sample period.
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Table 1.4: Evidence of preemptive entry: Control variables
Blue firm’s own store network and store density:
distance to the closest distribution center
distance to the closest Blue store
number of Blue stores within 30 and 50 miles
Competitor’s store network and store density:
distance to the closest Red firm’s distribution center
distance to the closest Red firm’s store
number of Red stores within 30 and 50 miles
Location characteristics:
local wage and rent at time of opening
local population and demographics within 30 miles of the location
opening hazard rate of location l in period t.
ln(hlt) = ln(h0t) + b1dl(t) + b2x0l(t),
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate at time t, dl(t) is the distance between location l and
its closest Red distribution center, and xl(t) is a set of control variables. The control variables
include Blue firm’s store and distribution center network characteristics11, Red firm’s store
characteristics and other location characteristics such as wage, rent, and demographics.
(See table 1.4 for detailed descriptions.) Since the stores in the sample are those that did
eventually get opened, the regression captures the incentives for firms to manipulate the
order of actions for strategic reasons.
11Since Blue firm was also expanding its distribution center network, distance to Blue’s distribution centers
is also time dependent.
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Column 1 of Table 1.5 presents the results of the Cox hazard regression. Standard errors
are clustered at the location level. The estimate indicates that a 100 mile increase in the
distance between a Blue store and the closest Red distribution center reduces the hazard
rate of Blue firm’s store opening by 1.6%. Table 1.5 column 2 reports the same regression
using an OLS framework. In this case, each observation is a store location. The estimated
coefficient on distance to Red distribution shows that when the distance between a Blue
store and its closest Red distribution center decreases by 100 miles, the opening time of the
store becomes 1.2 quarters earlier on average. These results suggest that, if Red firm is also
more likely to enter the same location, Blue firm is more likely to enter the location earlier
than otherwise. This is suggestive evidence of preemption.
Table 1.5: Evidence of preemptive entry: Blue firm’s timing of store openings
Duration before store opening, 1985-2001
Cox Hazard Model OLS
distance to closest red distribution center -0.016 1.179
(0.008) (0.246)
tot. no. stores around red distribution center 0.002 -0.021
(0.001) (0.010)
distance to closest blue distribution center -0.011 -0.470
(0.002) (0.435)
distance to closest blue store 0.533 -2.424
(0.133) (1.132)
no. of blue stores within 30mi -0.048 0.694
(0.016) (0.171)
no. of blue stores within 50mi -0.129 1.450
(0.010) (0.100)
distance to closest red store 0.632 -6.224
(0.120) (1.691)
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5: (continued)
Cox Hazard Model OLS
no. of red stores within 30mi 0.041 -0.360
(0.016) (0.154)
no. of red stores within 50mi -0.068 0.682
(0.012) (0.119)
local rent 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.003)
local wage -0.078 0.644
(0.016) (0.150)
no. of blue stores by 2002 0.113 -1.278
(0.008) (0.078)
no. of red stores by 2002 0.023 -0.162
(0.010) (0.095)
N 61544 1983
R2 0.66
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Overview
The model consists of two parts, a demand model and an entry model. The demand model
is needed for computing sales of each existing and potential store. It includes detailed
geographic information of consumer and store locations which allows store sales to be
spatially interdependent. Another source of spatial interdependence across stores comes
from the entry model. Entry decisions are modeled at the firm level subject to a budget
constraint in a dynamic discrete-choice game framework. Then two-stage budgeting and
separability are applied to make the model tractable. Finally, a clustering algorithm based
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on separability conditions is employed to define markets. Section 1.3.2 describes the demand
model, and Section 1.3.3 explains the entry model.
1.3.2 Demand
A demand model is needed in order to compute sales for each store location given consumer
demographic information and location characteristics. There are two main ways to model
demand in the literature. First, one can follow a Berry et al. (1995) type of model in which
consumers in each market choose from the same set of products. Markets are independent
and heterogeneity in consumer characteristics translates to different market shares of the
same product in each market. This model allows for unobserved preference heterogeneity
via random coefficients. Alternatively, one can adopt the demand model as in Holmes
(2011). In this model, there is no market division and each consumer has its own choice set.
This model has detailed geographic information about consumers and stores, and generates
spatial interdependence across store locations. The drawback of this model is that it does not
allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity due to the burden of computing a different
set of choice probabilities for each consumer.
I choose the latter approach because spatial interdependence is important for modeling
chain store’s entry decision. Since payoffs are maximized at the firm level, when evaluating
the payoff of a new store, firms need to take into account the impact of existing stores,
including each firm’s own stores and its competitor’s stores. For example, if Blue firm is
considering opening a new store in Boston, MA, it needs to evaluate the profitability of this
location bearing in mind the existing stores in the neighboring town of Cambridge, since
people living in both Boston and Cambridge can easily shop from all the stores located in
either of the two cities.
The drawback of this approach is that it does not allow for unobserved preference
heterogeneity. For example, the model is not able to capture the fact that different consumers
dislike distance between home and stores with different intensities. In theory, random
coefficients can be added to the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In practice,
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however, it is computationally infeasible. The model is already difficult to estimate given
that each unit of consumers (i.e. a block group) has a different choice set and a different set
of choice probabilities and that there are over 200,000 block groups in the continental U.S.
However, interaction terms in the regression and the definition of choice set for each block
group can be used to mediate the problem. A detailed explanation is provided later in this
section.
Each consumer i is a block group. Let uijl be the utility of consumer i shopping at firm
j’s store l.
uijl = bxjl + g1dil + g2dil ⇥ popdeni + # ijl ,
where xjl is a vector of store characteristics including a brand dummy indicating if the store
belongs to Blue or Red firm, the size of the store and if the store is newly opened in the
current period. dil is the distance between consumer i and store l. popdeni is population
density at block group i. Population density is measured by log of thousand people12 within
5 miles of block group i. When population density varies, the interaction of distance and
population density captures the heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences with respect to
distance to shops. # ijl’s are independent identically distributed and follow a type I extreme
value distribution. Let ui0 be consumer i’s utility of shopping from an outside option, i.e. a
store that does not belong to either Blue or Red firm:
ui0 = awi + # i0,
where wi is a vector of covariates that include a constant, population density, population
density squared, per capita income, and share of african-american, elderly, and young in the
population. ui0 allows the utility of shopping from the outside option to depend on location
characteristics. For example, more populated areas have more outside options and thus
higher utility of not shopping from any Blue or Red stores in the choice set. This attempts
to control for other competitors Blue and Red firms face in the market.
Block group i’s choice set is defined as Blue and Red stores within ri miles of the block
12Block groups with less than 1000 people are grouped together.
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group. ri is a function of population density,
25⇥ (1+ (median(popden)  popdeni)/median(popden)).
ri is in the interval between 17 and 35 miles, and equals 25 miles for the median block group
with respect to population density. Letting ri depend on population density captures the
heterogeneity of consumer preferences towards distance between home and shop across
areas with different population density, in terms of the furthest store they are willing to
travel to. ri increases as population density decreases. In other words, people living in rural
area might be willing to travel further to a shop than those living in urban areas.
Let pijl be the probability of consumer i shopping at store l. Then store l’s revenue is
Rjl = Â
i:dilri
l · pijl · ni, (1.3.1)
where l is average spending per consumer and ni is the total population in block group i.
Ideally l might depend on consumer characteristics wi. But the data is not detailed enough
to identify l(wi). This is because sales are only observed at the store level and that each
store has a different set of consumers i patronizing it. One would need individual consumer
level spending data to identify l(wi). The constant l is the average spending per consumer
across the nation. In one of the empirical specifications, l is allowed to depend on if store j
sells general merchandize only or both general merchandize and grocery13. Results do not
change very much. (See Section 2.2.1 for details.)
1.3.3 Firm’s entry decision
In this section, I describe the firm entry model and show how it becomes tractable by
applying two-stage budgeting and a clustering algorithm. I give an overview of the model
in 1.3.3.1, present the details of the model in 1.3.3.2, discuss two-stage budgeting in 1.3.3.3,
derive the separability conditions in 1.3.3.4, and explain the clustering algorithm in 1.3.3.5.
13As described in Section 1.2.2, the sales data of stores that sell both general merchandize and grocery only
includes sales of general merchandize.
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1.3.3.1 Overview of multi-store chain’s entry model
There are three features of this multi-store chain’s entry model. The first feature is that firms
maximize payoffs over all stores instead of at each store independently. This is important
because of the nature of multi-store retail chains, as well as of the spatial interdependence
between stores as illustrated by the demand estimation in 2.2.1. The second feature is
that firms are forward-looking. This is necessary when examining preemptive incentives.
Given that demographics and distribution networks are changing over time, it is reasonable
to assume that firms maximize the sum of expected current and future payoffs. Holmes
(2011) also showed that dynamic consideration is important for discount retail chain’s entry
decisions. The third feature is that there are strategic interactions between firms. This is
also necessary for studying preemptive entry. It is supported by the fact that Blue and Red
firm compete in many markets as shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. Findings in Jia (2008)
provide more evidence of strategic interactions. Therefore, I model firms’ entry decisions
using a discrete choice game framework in which decisions are made at the firm level.
In each period, firms choose the locations of a set of new stores to maximize the current
profits and the sum of discounted future values. When making the decision, each firm takes
into account the current and future demographics, distribution networks, local wage and
rent, its own store openings in the future, and its opponent’s store openings in current
and future periods. The decision is made at the firm level instead of individual store level.
The number of new stores to be opened is determined by a budget constraint. Since both
firms were expanding in the sample period, they face financial constraints. Moreover, the
constraint is necessary for studying preemptive incentives. Firms move sequentially each
period. Blue firm moves first.
The large number of possible locations and store openings of both firms in each period
leads to the very large state space in the game. As a result, the firm optimization problem
has high computational complexity for the firms as well as for the econometrician. Tools
that make the model tractable mimicking the way firms solve the problem in reality are
therefore desirable.
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1.3.3.2 Two-player discrete choice game
Let pljt be the static profit of firm j’s store l in period t.
pljt = µjR
l
jt(st)  wltE(Rljt(st))  rltL(Rljt(st))  yjDljt   ajxljt, (1.3.2)
where µj is the gross margin of firm j. st = (sjt, s jt), and sjt = {0, 1}L indicating if j has
a store at each location of all possible locations {1, ..., L}. Each location l contains up to
one store. Denote j’s opponent by  j. Rljt(st) is the revenue of store l in period t which
depends on st, the locations of both j’s stores and j’s opponent’s stores. I follow Holmes
(2011) in modeling labor cost and land cost as variable cost. wlt and rlt are local wage and
rent. E(Rljt(st)) is the number of employees and L(R
l
jt(st)) is the size of land. yjD
l
jt is the
distribution cost where yj is per unit distribution cost and Dljt is distance to distribution
center. ajxljt is fixed cost which depends on population density around store l, x
l
jt. Each
period t is a quarter. The firm level static profit is
pjt =
L
Â
l=1
sljt
n
µjRljt(st)  wltE(Rljt(st))  rltL(Rljt(st))  yjDljt   ajxljt
o
, (1.3.3)
where the sum is over all the locations of firm j stores.
Next I introduce the value function of the firm. For simplicity, I assume sequential
move and that Blue firm moves first14. aljt denotes firm j’s action at location l in period t,
where l 2 {1 · · · Lt}. aljt = 1 if j opens a new store at l in period t, and aljt = 0 otherwise.
Lt is the set of all possible locations minus those taken by the two firms before period t,
i.e. Lt = L/{sjt, s jt}. sjt+1 = sjt + ajt, where sjt 2 {0, 1}L. Let zjt be the location of j’s
distribution centers in period t and Bjt be the budget constraint of firm j in period t. For
notational simplicity, let sjt = (sjt, zjt, Bjt), and st = (sjt, s jt) be the state variable. Firm j’s
14This is a strong assumption. In the future, I would like to flip the order and solve the game for when Red
firm moves first.
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value function in period t is
V(sjt, s jt) = max
ajt2At
(
Ep(sjt + ajt, s jt) + b Â
s jt+1
EV(sjt + ajt, s jt+1)P(s jt+1|sjt+1, s jt)
)
(1.3.4)
s.t.
Lt
Â
l=1
f (aljt)  Bjt, (1.3.5)
where At = {0, 1}Lt is the choice set in period t subject to the budget constraint Bjt. The
expectation is over a cost shock hljt of entering at location l. h
l
jt are i.i.d. across locations and
time periods. P(s jt+1|sjt+1, s jt) is the transition probability of j’s opponent in period t.
f (aljt) is the budget function which I will discuss in more detail. b is the discount factor.
Each period, firm j chooses the optimal entry decision ajt 2 At to maximize the
sum of expected profits Ep(sjt + ajt, s jt) and the continuation value bÂs jt+1 EV(sjt +
ajt, s jt+1)P(s jt+1|sjt+1, s jt). The distribution of hljt is common knowledge but its realiza-
tion is private information. Firm j’s strategy sj is a function from the state variable st to a
set of choice probabilities Pr(ajt|st). Perception of future states P(st+1|st) is consistent with
equilibrium play. The solution is a Bayesian Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
The difference between this model and the commonly used incomplete information
dynamic game framework (Ryan, 2012) is that it has a budget constraint in Equation (1.3.5).
Think of the budget function f as a cost of opening Âl aljt stores in period t. It represents the
actual costs of acquiring land or building infrastructure, as well as the management costs of
hiring workers or submitting paperwork to the local government. There are three reasons to
include this condition. First, it mimics the way firms behave. According to the managers
I interviewed, each period, firms designate a certain amount of funds for the opening of
new stores, which is equivalent to a budget constraint. Second, both firms are expanding
in the sample period 1985-2001. Financial constraints can often be a serious consideration
when firms are expanding. Figure 1.5 plots the book value of total assets of Blue and Red
firm in the sample period, in respective colors. The figure shows that Blue firm’s book
value of total assets grew fast in this period. Thus it is likely that the financial constraints
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Figure 1.5: Book value of total assets, 1985-2002
Blue firm is facing are substantial at the beginning of this period and are reduced by the
end of this period. Third, the budget constraints are necessary for studying preemptive
incentives. If firms were not liquidity constrained, in theory, they could enter all markets to
deter entry by the competitor in period 0. This is unrealistic both in terms of financial costs
and management costs. For simplicity, I assume hereafter that ÂLtl=1 f (a
l
jt) = Â
Lt
l=1 a
l
jt  Bjt,
i.e. the total number new stores each firm can open in each period is held fixed at the
observed level. Note that although Bjt is a choice made by the firm, the assumption does
not cause selection issues since the choice probabilities become conditional probabilities
given the optimal budget constraint Bjt.
Next I explain how the set of potential locations L is defined in the game. I restrict L to
be all the locations Blue and Red firm eventually entered by the end of the sample period.
The alternative would be to include all possible locations regardless of the existence of a
store at any point in time. There are two reasons for choosing the former approach over the
alternative one. First, for the purpose of studying preemptive incentives, it is reasonable
to focus on locations firms are potentially interested in entering. If a location is very far
from being profitable enough for either firm to ever enter, it does not provide information
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for identifying preemptive incentives. Second, including locations where no entry is ever
observed implies dividing the U.S. national market into many smaller markets. The division
usually involves using census geographic units as markets (Jia, 2008, Zhu and Singh, 2009,
Ellickson et al., 2013). This allows little spatial competition and, as shown below, may lead
to biased results. The drawback of defining observed stores by the end of the sample period
as the set of potential locations is that firm’s decisions are very much affected by the limited
choice set towards the end of the sample period. To avoid the problem, I leave out the last
two years of data and only include observations between 1985 and 1999 as the sample of
study. The choice of leaving out two years, specifically, will be explained in 2.2.3.
Modeling entry decisions at firm level and allowing for spatial interdependence of store
locations captures the nature of spatial competition between multi-store chains, but it also
makes the problem intractable. Each period, firms are choosing from the set of potential
locations that have not been occupied. Since both firms are expanding very fast in the
sample period, the choice set is very large. Take t = 36, the fourth quarter of 1993, as an
example, Blue firm and Red firm opened 27 and 24 stores respectively. The total number
of potential locations is 1262. With a total of 1262 locations, the size of the state space is
(126227 ) ⇡ 1035.
1.3.3.3 Two-stage budgeting
In this section, I describe how two-stage budgeting and separability can be applied to make
the model tractable, while retaining the features described above. Two-stage budgeting refers
to the fact that consumers first allocate a given amount of total expenditure to categories
of goods and then optimize consumption within each category, conditional on the amount
of expenditure designated to this category of goods (Gorman, 1971)15. I apply this idea
to chain stores’ entry problem. Store locations are similar to goods in the consumption
problem. Let {1, ..., PMt} be a partition of potential locations {1, ..., Lt} in period t. Partitions
mimic the categories of goods in the consumption problem. Two-stage budgeting implies
15Note only the separability conditions are needed here, the conditions for constructing price index are not.
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that firms solve the following problem. For each Pm 2 {1, ..., PMt},
V(sjmt, s jmt|Bmt) = max
ajmt2Amt
⇢
Ep(sjmt + ajmt, s jmt) + b Â
s jmt+1
EV(sjmt + ajmt, s jmt+1|Bmt)
· P(s jmt+1|sjmt+1, s jmt)
 
(1.3.6)
s.t.
Â
l2m
aljt  Bjmt,
where sjmt = {0, 1}m and Bjmt is the budget constraint of element Pm of the partition
{1, ..., PMt}. 1.3.6 corresponds to the consumption problem in stage 2. Then, firm j solves for
the optimal budget {Bj1t, ..., BjMt t} for each element Pm of the partition:
Mt
Â
m=1
EV(sjmt, s jmt|Bjmt) (1.3.7)
s.t.
Mt
Â
m=1
Bjmt  Bjt,
which corresponds to the stage 1 of the consumption problem.
With two-stage budgeting, firms solve two smaller optimization problems, (1.3.6) and
(1.3.7) instead of the problem in (1.3.4). This decentralization greatly reduces the size of the
state space in estimation. When estimating a model like (1.3.6), one can condition on the
the optimal budget of each element of the partition {Bjmt}Mtm=1, and only solve the stage 2
problem (1.3.6). The state space is then reduced to ÂMtm=1 (
|Pm|
Âl2m aljt
).
Moreover, two-stage budgeting is a good approximation to how firms actually behave.
Blue firm, for example, divides the U.S. national market into regions. According to the
manager I interviewed, regional managers choose a set of potential new store locations each
period, and submit the locations to the headquarter. Managers in the headquarter then rank
the potential locations from all regions and decide which stores will be opened subject to a
budget constraint.
However, it is not clear whether solving (1.3.6) and (1.3.7) is equivalent to solving (1.3.4).
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In the next two sections, I show that under a set of conditions, namely separability, solving
the two-stage budgeting problem in (1.3.6) and (1.3.7) is equivalent to solving the overall
optimization problem (1.3.4). Then I derive sufficient conditions on the primitives of the
model such that the separability conditions are satisfied. I define a market to be an element
of the partition Pm. I show that the solution to the two-stage budgeting problem is optimal
if separability across markets holds.
1.3.3.4 Separability conditions in a two-player Markov game
Separability is defined following the work of Gorman (1959, 1971) and is further generalized
to be applicable to a two-player dynamic game setting. First, to build intuition, I define
separability in the static game context. For simplicity, the subscript t is suppressed. Let sj
be firm j’s strategy. s = (sj, s j) is the state variable. Firms solve
maxsj(s)p(sj + aj, s j + a j) s.t.
L
Â
l=1
alj  Bj. (1.3.8)
Let {P1, · · · , PM} be a partition of the potential store locations {1, · · · , L}. Denote p(slj =
1, s lj , s j) the profit of j when j has a store at location l. Define
DEp(sj, s j, l) = E[p(slj = 1, s
 l
j , s j)  p(slj = 0, s lj , s j)],
to be the expected marginal profit of j entering l when the state variable s equals (sj, s j),
where the expectation is taken over the cost shock hlj .
Definition 1.1 Locations {1, · · · , L}are separable in the partition {P1, · · · , PM} if
DEp(sj, s j, l)
DEp(sj, s j, h)
?(skj , sk j), 8l, h 2 Pml , 8k /2 Pmk ,
where l, h 2 Pml , and k 2 Pmk .
In other words, if the ratio of the expected marginal profits of opening any two locations
in a market does not depend on the state variables in another market, locations are separable
with respect to markets. This too is analogous to the consumption problem, in which
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separability holds when the rates of substitution of any two goods are independent across
categories of goods (Gorman, 1959). Next, I define separability in strategy sj. Note sj(s) can
be written as a vector (s1j (s), · · · , sMj (s)) for any partition {P1, · · · , PM}. Similarly, any state
variable sj can be written as a vector (sj1, · · · , sjM). Let s⇤j be the best response of j given
opponent’s strategy s j, and a⇤j be the corresponding optimal action at state (sj, s j).
Definition 1.2 Firm j’s strategy s⇤j is separable in the partition {P1, · · · , PM} if for given s j,
9s⇤j1, s⇤j2, · · · s⇤jM s.t.
s⇤jm(sjm, s jm, Bm) = s⇤mj (sj, s j, B),
where s⇤j =
⇣
s⇤1j , · · · , s⇤Mj
⌘
, Bm = (B⇤jm, B jm), B⇤jm = Âl2Pm a
⇤l
j , B jm = Âl2Pm a
l
 j, 8m =
1, · · · ,M, and ÂMm=1 Bm = B.
In other words, s⇤j is separable if each of its component s⇤mj can be written as a function s
⇤
jm
which only depends on the state variable in the partition m, (sjm, s jm), and on the budget
constraint of the partition, Bm. This implies that conditional on the optimal budget of the
partition B⇤jm, j is able to compute the best response in partition j with information within
the partition m only, regardless of the values of state variables or budget levels in other
components of the partition.
Theorem 1.1 If locations {1, · · · , L} are separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM}, and the opponent’s
strategy s⇤ j is separable, then j’s optimal strategy s⇤j is separable.
See Appendix I for the details of the proof. Theorem 1.1 states that if locations {1, · · · , L}
are separable and that one firm is playing a separable strategy, then it must be optimal for
the other firm to play a separable strategy as well. In other words, both firm’s strategies are
separable in equilibrium. Define such an equilibrium as separable equilibrium. Separable
equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium.
Next, I derive sufficient conditions on the primitives such that separability of locations
holds. There are four parts of the profit function (1.3.3) that need to be examined for
separability. The first three terms in the profit function all depend on revenue Rlj(st), thus
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Rlj(s) needs to satisfy the separability condition. The other three terms are the distribution
cost, the fixed cost, and the cost shock when opening a new store hlj .
Theorem 1.2 The location {1, · · · , L} is separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM} if the profit function
p(·) satisfies the following conditions,
1. Rlj(s) is additively separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM},
2. Distribution cost, as well as fixed cost, at location l is independent of zkj and x
k
j , where
k 2 Pn,m 6= n,
3. hlj are independently distributed across markets.
See appendix for the proof. By Equation (1.3.1), it is clear that if @i, s.t.
pijl > 0, pijk > 0, l 2 Pm, k 2 Pn,m 6= n, (1.3.9)
then the first condition in Theorem 1.2 holds. In other words, if there does not exist
consumer i that shops from both store l in market Pm and store k which belongs to a
different market Pn (i.e. stores in different markets do not share customers), then stores
{1, · · · , L} are separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM}. The second condition is automatically
satisfied by the specification of distribution cost yjDlj and fixed cost ajx
l
j. The condition can
be violated if, for example, the distribution center has a capacity constraint and per unit
cost of distributing depends on the number of stores the distribution center serves. The
third condition is satisfied by the i.i.d. assumption on the cost shock hlj .
Finally, I generalize the separability conditions derived above to a dynamic game setting
with Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium. The definitions are very similar to the static
case, except for two differences: 1) the expected static profit function Ep(s) becomes the
expected value function EV(sjt, s jt) in Equation (1.3.4), 2) instead of the market level
budget constraint in one period, strategies are separable conditional on the sequence of
market level budget constraint {Bjmt, B jmt}•j=1, for all m. The results in Theorem 1.1 and
Theorem 1.2 apply. See Appendix I for details and the proofs.
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1.3.3.5 Separability and market division
In order to apply two-stage budgeting, a sufficient condition is that the markets are separable,
as discussed in the previous section. In this section, I present the tools needed to divide the
U.S. national market into smaller separable markets. This is done by applying a clustering
algorithm based on the separability condition and the demand model. I first define the
objective function for the clustering algorithm and then I explain the steps of the algorithm
to find an optimal partition of store locations given the objective function. Each element of
the partition is defined as a market. Results are postponed to Section 2.2.2.
The main condition that needs to hold for markets to be separable is that revenue is
independent across markets. In other words, stores in two different markets do not share
customers. This condition is automatically satisfied if two stores are so far away from each
other, that no consumer has both stores in its choice set. Clearly, the difficulties in dividing
markets arise when two markets are next to each other and consumers living close to the
border of the two markets are willing to shop from either store. In reality, two neighboring
stores almost never share no customer, except in areas where population density is extremely
low and the stores are very far from each other. Therefore, I define an objective function
for the clustering algorithm that captures how far away the partition is from being truly
separable.
Define the objective function as the following,
min{P1,··· ,PM}
Lt
Â
l=1
[Rl(s,w)  Rl(sm,wm|l 2 Pm)]2, (1.3.10)
where Lt16 is the set of potential locations in period t, Rl(s,w) is the revenue of store l,
which depends on the set of existing stores of both firms s and the determinants w of
demand which include demographic characteristics and store characteristics. Note both s
and w are vectors that contain information about the entire U.S. market. The second term
Rl(sm,wm|l 2 Pm) is also store l’s revenue, but it is computed using information of existing
16I kept the t subscript to differentiate Lt from L, which is all locations including both Lt the potential
locations and those that have been entered up to period t.
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store locations and demand data only in the partition Pm. That is, it is the revenue of store l
if l is assigned to market Pm. In this case, some of the spatial interdependence between l
and any other store h that belongs to a different market Pn, n 6= m, is not accounted for. In
other words, if l and h share any customers, those customers are restricted to shop at only
one of the two stores. Consumers in block groups that have both l and h in their choice set
are assigned to the market that their closest store belongs to17. If Pm is truly separable from
the rest of the markets, then Rl(s,w)  Rl(sm,wm|l 2 Pm) is zero for all l 2 Pm. Therefore,
the sum of squared differences between Rl(s,w) and Rl(sm,wm|l 2 Pm) indicates how far
off a partition is from each of its elements being truly separable, or the loss of assuming the
elements are separable. The solution to Equation (1.3.10) finds the optimal partition that
minimizes this loss.
Next, I introduce the clustering algorithm that attempts to find a solution to Equation
(1.3.10). Since it is a graph partitioning problem that is NP-hard (Fortunato and Castellano,
2009), the solution is an approximation. Although there might be other approximated
solutions to this problem, results in section 2.2.2 indicate that the clustering algorithm does
reasonably well.
Start with M = 2. Apply a greedy algorithm which locally minimizes the objective
function to find an approximated global solution to Equation (1.3.10). Then increase M
and repeat the previous step. Stop when the stopping criterion binds. Due to the complex
geographic structure of the model, greedy algorithm is more suitable than other algorithms
such as spectrum algorithm that has the advantage of speed but assumes additional structure
of the problem. I describe the greedy algorithm and the stopping criterion in the remainder
of this section.
The greedy algorithm finds the optimal partition {P1, · · · , PM} given the objective
function (1.3.10) and the number of clusters M. Figure 1.6 demonstrates the idea for M = 2.
Each dot is a store. The edge between a pair of dots means that the two stores share
customers. The task is to cut off a few edges such that the set of locations is divided
17I also tried assigning consumers to the market their most preferred store belongs to. Results are similar.
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Figure 1.6: Graph partitioninga
aFortunato and Castellano, 2009
into two markets. The broken edges are selected so that the objective function (1.3.10) is
minimized. There are two features of the problem that are important for the set-up of
the greedy algorithm. First, only stores close to the border of two markets matter. The
objective function is zero for stores that have all connected neighbors in the same market.
This feature leads to the fact that the algorithm focuses on stores close to the borders of
markets. Second, the edges between stores are weighted. The weight is the amount of
interdependence between two stores and is decided by the demand data and the objective
function. The weight varies across edges, thus one cannot simply minimize the number of
broken edges in a graph to find the optimal partition.
The algorithm follows four steps.
1. For a given partition of locations {P1, · · · , PM}t, find all l s.t. 9h 2 Cl , and h 2 Pn, but
l 2 Pm, and m 6= n, where Cl is the set of locations l is connected to.
2. Reassign each l in the previous step to a partition such that (1.3.10) is minimized keep-
ing the assignment of all the other stores fixed. Call the new partition {P1, · · · , PM}(t+1).
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 untill the algorithm converges.
4. Repeat step 1, 2, and 3 for 1000 different initial partitions {P1, · · · , PM}0.
One nice property of this algorithm is that the resulting partition respects contiguity. If all
the connected neighbors of some store(s) belong to one partition, the store(s) itself cannot
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be in a different partition. I.e. If h 2 Pm, 8h 2 Cl , then it must be that l 2 Pm.
Finally, I explain the stopping criterion for picking the number of partitions M. As the
number of clusters increases, the incremental change of loss, i.e. the value of (1.3.10), also
increases. The stopping criterion is chosen when the sum of incremental change of loss from
M to M+ 1 partitions is bigger than or equal to 1% of revenue Rl(s,w) for any store l18. It
also happens to be the point at which the incremental change of loss increases dramatically
in many cases.
18Sensitivity checks on the 1% criterion are to be conducted. Future research is needed to obtain a more
systematic stopping criterion.
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Chapter 2
Spatial Competition and Preemptive
Entry in the Discount Retail Industry:
Structural Estimation
2.1 Introduction
Following the behavioral model described in Chapter 1, this chapter provides empirical
evidence to preemptive entry and evaluates local government’s subsidy policy in the
discount retail industry.
First, this chapter demonstrates how the cost parameters are estimated using the behav-
ioral model and the data described in Section 1.2.2. This is done in three steps. In the first
step, consumer preferences are recovered by a demand estimation that allows consumers
to shop from nearby stores and therefore stores to compete for the shopping dollars of the
consumers. In the second step, potential store locations that firms are choosing from are
divided into markets. Market divisions are inferred from data and the estimated consumer
preferences. In the last step, cost parameters are recovered by solving a two-player dynamic
location game. The continuation values of the potential store locations are computed using
a rolling-window approximation.
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Using the cost estimates, I conduct two counterfactual studies. First, to quantify pre-
emptive incentives in firms’ store location decisions, I compute the optimal decision firms
would have made if the amount of preemptive incentives they are facing is reduced in the
game. By computing the sum of discounted current and future payoffs of both firms, I show
that preemption leads to loss of producer surplus of about $1 million dollars per store on
average. Second, I compute the amount of subsidies Blue firm would need to open stores at
those locations Red firm exited and show that the observed subsidy level is too low to affect
Blue firm’s entry decisions.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 shows how the value functions can be
approximated and presents the estimation results. Counterfactuals under which preemptive
motives are removed are presented in Section 2.3. The subsidy policy application is presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Estimation and Clustering
2.2.1 Demand estimation
I estimate the demand model using a maximum likelihood framework. Like Holmes (2011),
I assume the discrepancy between the model and the data is measurement error and that
the error follows a normal distribution. Denote the measurement error by ejl and observed
sales of store l by Robsjl . Then
ln(Robsjl ) = ln(Rjl) + ejl ,
where ejl ⇠ N(0, s2).
Results of the demand estimation are presented in Table 2.1. The first column shows the
results of the basic specification. Spending per person is on average $47 per week, which
is $2444 per year. This is close to the estimate in Holmes (2011), that is of about $2150
per year in 2007 dollars. The coefficient of population density is positive and significant.
The coefficient on distance is negative and significant. I interpret the coefficients using
comparative statics in Table 2.2. Column 2 presents a different specification with a dummy
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variable indicating whether a store sells both general merchandise and grocery. The results
are similar.
Table 2.1: Demand estimates
Average weekly sales in $1000s by store
specification1 specification2
s2 0.082 0.080
(0.002) (0.002)
spending per person 0.047 0.050
(0.002) (0.002)
grocery dummy -0.005
(0.000)
constant -3.149 -3.151
(0.253) (0.269)
popden 1.270 1.270
(0.060) (0.062)
popden2 -0.022 -0.020
(0.006) (0.006)
per capita income 0.009 0.010
(0.002) (0.002)
black 0.246 0.318
(0.062) (0.063)
old -0.522 -0.566
(0.279) 0.285
young 0.052 0.052
(0.336) (0.344)
size 0.504 0.505
(0.198) 0.200
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1: (continued)
specification1 specification2
blue 0.312 0.312
(0.053) (0.053)
new -0.117 -0.107
(0.024) (0.022)
distance -0.440 -0.441
(0.020) (0.021)
distance ⇤ popden 0.020 0.019
(0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.843 0.845
Number of stores=4750
Number of blockgroups=202020
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
I use comparative statics to illustrate the effects of distance to shops in the choice set and
population density on store sales. This exercise also demonstrates how spatial competition
is generated from demand. Consider a Red store located two miles away from the median
block group and a new Blue store entering the market. First, I fix the population density
of the block group and compute the probabilities of consumers shopping at the Red store
when the distance between the new Blue store and the block group changes. Column 1 in
Table 2.2 reports the choice probabilities when population density equals 1. Moving up
across the rows, the choice probabilities decrease as distance to the Blue store decreases.
This shows that the competition between the two stores intensifies as the Blue store moves
closer to the consumers. The result stays the same across columns when population density
takes on different values. Row 1 reports the probabilities of consumers shopping at the Red
store when population density increases and distance to Blue store stays at 2 miles. From
left to right, choice probabilities decrease as population density increases. This shows that
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Table 2.2: Demand comparative statics
Probabilities of shopping at Red store
Population density
Distance 1 10 50 250
2 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.01
4 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.02
10 0.80 0.33 0.08 0.02
20 0.88 0.34 0.08 0.02
the utility of choosing the outside option increases as population density increases.
2.2.2 Clustering results
In this section, I present the clustering result and compare it to an alternative definition of
markets in the literature, Core Business Statistical Areas (CBSA).
Since the set of potential locations Lt changes every period, the partitioning of markets
is conducted every period. Note the existing stores are not partitioned because they are no
longer in the choice set of the firms. Consequently, the spatial interdependence between
existing stores and potential stores is fully accounted for. As a result, in the empirical
analysis, market definitions are different in each period. The advantage of this assumption
is that it is close to how managers actually make entry decisions. According to the managers
and consultants I interviewed, when firms evaluate a potential store location, they define a
trade area around it. The trade area is defined as the area which demand is likely to come
from and which the main competing stores including the firm’s own stores and competitors’
stores are located at. Naturally, the trade area varies across time as new stores are opened
each period. Therefore, the clustering procedure can also be viewed as estimating trade
areas each period. The disadvantage of doing so is that it does not allow any market level
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unobservables that can be controlled for using market fixed effects.
Figure 2.1 is a map of the northeast, mid-atlantic and (part of) southeast United States.
It is the area where store density was the highest in the third quarter of 1997. The points
(squares, dots, and diamonds) are the potential store locations in this period. Neighboring
stores are marked with different colors or shapes to display market divisions. The CBSAs
also appear in the map, in yellow. This map compares market divisions defined by the
clustering algorithm to the CBSA units. In a few cases, using CBSA as a market is not very
different from the clustering of the store locations. For example, the single black dot in the
very northeast is the only store in its market after clustering. In this particular case, defining
market as the CBSA of the store may not be a bad idea, since there are no other store around.
However, in most cases, defining a CBSA as a market can be misleading. For example, the
five blue dots just southwest of the black dot are defined as in one market by clustering,
while they are located in three different CBSAs. Dividing the stores into three different
market would be misleading since they are very close to each other, and at least two of them
are almost right at the border of two CBSAs. Consumers do not confine themselves to shop
within CBSA boundaries, so it is not reasonable to define markets with this restriction. Such
restriction is minimized in the division of markets by applying the clustering algorithm.
Table 2.3 presents a few measures demonstrating the goodness of the clustering results
and compares them with those by using CBSAs as markets. The measures are computed
using all Lt locations in the third quarter of 1997. There are 241 potential locations. First,
the total loss by clustering as a fraction of total sales, i.e. [Âl |S(l)  S(l 2 r⇤)|]/[Âl |S(l)],
is less than 0.001%. The maximum store level loss as a fraction of sales is also reasonably
small, 0.5%. Finally, the total number of stores affected by clustering is 55. This shows
that simply excluding these locations is not a satisfying option, since it reduces the sample
size by more than 20%. On the other hand, using each CBSA as a market would lead to
undesirable results. The maximum store level loss is 53.0%, about a hundred times higher
than that of clustering.
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Figure 2.1: Markets by clustering and CBSAs, 1997Q3
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Table 2.3: Clustering results comparison with CBSA markets
Clustering CBSA
Max loss per location
maxl [|S(l)  S(l 2 r⇤)|/S(l)] 0.005 0.530
Total loss
[Âl |S(l)  S(l 2 r⇤)|] / [Âl S(l)] 6⇥ 10 5 8⇥ 10 3
Affected locations
Âl S(l) 6=S(l|l2r⇤) 55 123
Number of locations 241 241
2.2.3 Cost estimation
In this section, I explain the estimation of the cost function. Due to the non-stationary
nature of the game, the estimation takes a different approach from the two-stage procedure
proposed by BBL or POB. The approach includes two main parts. It first computes the value
function using a ‘rolling window’ approximation. Then the game is solved using backwards
induction and the approximated continuation values. The advantage of the approach is
that it is more suitable for the counterfactual of interest which is to examine preemptive
incentives, and that it is closer to how managers actually make entry decisions, as will be
discussed later.
First, I describe the estimation of the parameters outside the dynamic game. Recall
firm’s static profit of store l is given by (1.3.2). The gross margin, labor cost, and land cost
are estimated following Holmes (2011). µj is computed using information in firms’ annual
reports. The average gross margin for Blue and Red firm is 0.24 and 0.22, respectively. The
amount of labor and land of a store is assumed to be proportional to revenue:
E(Rljt) = µER
l
jt,
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L(Rljt) = µLR
l
jt.
µE is calibrated using labor costs listed in firms’ annual reports. µL is computed using
census data and county property tax data of a subset of stores. See Appendix A of Holmes
(2011) for details.
The estimated parameters in the dynamic game are per unit distribution cost yj and
fixed cost aj of Blue and Red firm. Recall firms choose the optimal locations given the
total number of new stores to open each period by maximizing (1.3.4). Applying two-stage
budgeting to this problem with separable markets, firms first choose the optimal locations
within each market given the total number of new stores in each market, and then optimize
over market level budgets. In the estimation, for computational reasons, I condition on the
observed market level budgets and use the information in firms’ entry decisions within each
market only. In other words, each period, firms solve Equation (1.3.6) for each independent
market. Without computational constraints, one can in addition solve the upper level
optimization problem to get the optimal number of new stores allocated to each market.
Most of the dynamic game estimation methods in the literature follow a two-stage
procedure as in BBL or POB. However, the current problem does not fit in the two-stage
estimation framework, for two reasons.
First, in the two-stage framework, the state transition probabilities are estimated non-
parametrically in the first stage. This requires observing each state repeatedly in the sample.
In the current sample, however, no state is observed more than once. The nature of the
problem is non-stationary. Because both firms are expanding in the sample period, the
number of stores keep growing and new stores appear every period. Although clustering
and market division that are done every period make the evaluation of potential locations
focus on local nearby locations and demographics, the set of potential locations are different
in each period. To convert the problem into one that fits the two-stage estimation framework,
one solution would be to divide different states into groups by some similarity measure and
to treat each groups of states as a single state. This is not desirable for a second reason: the
state contains rich geographic information that can be important for studying preemptive
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incentives. Location characteristics contained in the state variable include the number of
competitor’s stores, stores belonging to the same firm around them, distance to those stores,
distance to the distribution center, and demographic information. They are important
information for identifying preemptive incentives. Pooling them into groups may bias the
results.
Second, even if the estimation can be done using the two-stage method, the counter-
factuals of interest cannot. Using the transition probabilities estimated in the first stage to
compute the preemption counterfactual can be problematic. In the counterfactual where
preemption is removed, it will be required that players optimize the entry decision without
taking into account preemption motives, i.e. firms are not fully optimizing. If the transition
probabilities are estimated in the first stage non-parametrically and applied in the coun-
terfactual, it is not guaranteed that those are still the correct transition probabilities when
preemption is not allowed. Therefore, the two-stage estimation method is not suitable.
One alternative way to estimate the game is to solve for the nested fixed point as in Pakes
(1986) and Rust (1987). In other words, for a fixed parameter value, the dynamic game can
be solved and the optimal choice probabilities Pr(ajmt|st) can be matched to the observed
entry decisions in each market and each period. Then, the above step is repeated for many
parameter values to find the estimate that maximizes the likelihood of the observed choice.
The difficulty is that instead of the single agent’s dynamic problem in Pakes (1986) and Rust
(1987), the current problem also has strategic interactions between players, which makes the
value function more difficult to compute. Next, I describe how the value function can be
approximated using a ‘rolling window’ method.
Each period, in each market m, firm chooses Bjmt locations to open new stores from the
Lmt potential stores. The set of potential locations Lmt is all the locations Blue and Red firm
entered between t and the end of the sample period, T. First, the value function can be
computed by solving the game using backwards induction. Starting from the last period, T,
terminal values can be computed for each possible state smT. I assume the terminal value
equals EV(smT)/(1  b). b is set to be 0.99, i.e. the annual discount factor is 0.95. EV(smT)
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can be computed by solving the game for the last two years of data left out of the sample. It
allows the decision in period T to be dynamic with respect to the 8 periods ahead, instead
of completely static. The implicit assumption is that firms do not foresee any more entry or
change in demographics after T + 2. This is a limitation but no more data is available.
Second, to compute the continuation value for each of the ( LmtBjmt) states, the value function
needs to be computed for each of the possible states in the future between t and T+ 2. This
is computationally infeasible. For period t = 1, Lt = L = 3123. Assume clustering can
reduce the market size to 301, the number of value functions need to be computed is✓
Lm
B1m1
◆
·
✓
Lm   B1m1
B2m1
◆
· · ·
✓
Lm  ÂTt=1Âj Bjmt
B1mT
◆
·
✓
Lm  ÂTt=t Âj Bjmt   B1mT
B2mT
◆
=
✓
Lm
B1m
◆
·
 ✓
B1m
B1mT
◆
·
✓
B2m
B2mT
◆
·
✓
B1m   B1mT
B1m(T 1)
◆
·
✓
B2m   B2mT
B2m(T 1)
◆
· · ·
!
, (2.2.1)
where Bjm is the total number of new stores that belong to firm j in market m, j = 1, 2.
Assume half of the stores are Blue, the first term (3015) is on the order of 10
8. Moreover,
the game has to be solved for each parameter value in the estimation. Therefore, an
approximation of the value function is necessary for both the firm and the econometrician.
As discussed above, changing the state variables to reduce the size of the state space
is not a desirable approach. One can also reduce the state space by restricting j’s choice
set to be locations entered by j only. In this case, the first term in (2.2.1) would become
1. However, not allowing firm j to choose from  j’s observed locations rules out some of
the strategic interactions between the two firms, including preemptive incentives. As an
alternative, I restrict the choice set of the firm in each period using a rolling window. For
each period t, instead of choosing from all observed locations between t and T + 2, firms
choose from those entered by either firm between t and t+ 8. In other words, j solves the
1This is already unrealistic. It implies the locations need to be divided into 100 markets, therefore the loss
from clustering must be substantial.
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following equation in period t for each market m,
V(sjmt, s jmt) = max
ajmt2Amt
⇢ t+8
Â
t=t
bt t
(1  b) {t=t+8} Âs jmt Âsjmt
EV(sjmt, s jmt)
P(sjmt|sjmt + ajmt, s jmt)P(s jmt|sjmt + ajmt, s jmt)
 
(2.2.2)
s.t.
L¯mt
Â
l=1
aljmt  Bjmt,
where L¯t is the set of locations entered by Blue and Red firm between t and t + 8,
(1  b) {t=t+8} is a scaling factor for terminal period t + 8. This reduces the computa-
tional burden dramatically. Clustering is now done over location L¯t which is all potential
locations between t and t+ 8. The maximum size of market, L¯mt is 12 after taking out a few
city centers.
The approximation is close to how managers actually make decisions. According to the
managers I interviewed, firms usually have a fairly good idea about how many stores they
are planning to open and where the potential locations are in the next two years, which
corresponds to 8 periods in my model. Beyond the two year window, it is difficult for
managers to foresee how many new markets they are likely to enter or where the desirable
locations could be.
However, the approximation imposes two restrictions on firm’s optimization problem.
First, since the optimization stops at t+ 8, any change of the state variable after t+ 8, and
thus any change of the continuation value, is not taken into account. The number of possible
paths that need to be evaluated becomes✓
Lmt
B1mt
◆
·
✓
Lmt   B1mt
B2mt
◆
· · ·
✓
Lmt  Ât+7t=t Âj Bjmt
B1mt+8
◆
·
✓
Lmt  Ât+7t=t Âj Bjmt   B1mt+8
B2mt+8
◆
. (2.2.3)
Second, the possible paths firm j is optimizing over between t and t+ 8 are further restricted
due to the restriction of choice sets by the rolling window. All the Lt in (2.2.3) becomes
L¯t, and therefore the last term in (2.2.3) becomes 1. The computational burden is further
reduced. However, the possible paths between t and t+ 8 are restricted to include only
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observed locations L¯t, that is, any locations entered after period t+ 8 are not considered as
a potential location in period t. I am currently working on testing how sensitive the results
are to this restriction by allowing the length of the rolling window to vary.
Finally, I do a grid search through the parameter space and use maximum likelihood
to estimate the parameters {yj, aj}, j = 1, 2. Assume the cost shock of each action follows
a type I extreme value distribution. Then the choice probabilities P(sjmt+1|sjmt, s jmt) have
a closed form solution. For a given parameter value, I solve the game in (2.2.2) for each
market, period, and firm, and match the choice probabilities to the observed choice by:
maxyj,ajÂ
m
Â
t
Â
j
log
⇣
Pr(ajmt|sjmt, s jmt,yj, aj)Y(ajmt)
⌘
, (2.2.4)
where
Pr(ajmt|sjmt, s jmt,yj, aj) =
exp(EV(sjmt + ajmt, s jmt))
Âajmt2Ajmt exp(EV(sjmt + ajmt, s jmt))
,
and Y(ajmt) is the indicator of the observed choice, i.e.
Y(ajmt) =
8><>: 1 ajmt = a
observed
0 otherwise
.
2.2.4 Estimation results and interpretation
Table 2.4 presents the estimation results of distribution cost and fixed cost by firm. The
distribution cost per thousand-mile is 1.61 million dollars for Blue firm and 0.68 million
dollars for Red firm. Using industry sources, Holmes (2011) estimated Blue firm’s trucking
cost of distribution to be 0.8 million dollars per thousand-mile. Using his model, he
estimated the total distribution cost to be around 3.5 million dollars per thousand-mile. My
estimate of 1.61 is in the interval of [0.8, 3.5], and closer to the industry source of trucking
cost than Holmes’ estimate. Holmes interprets his estimate of distribution cost as economies
of scale, since it measures the average cost saving of locating a store 1000 miles closer to a
distribution center in a single agent’s optimization problem. The smaller economies of scale
in my results is mainly due to the fact that the model takes into account interactions with
Red firm. Since distribution centers are located in rural areas, moving a store closer to a
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Table 2.4: Distribution and fixed cost estimates
Parameter estimates and 95% confidence intervals
Blue firm’s distribution cost ($1000/mi) 1.61
[1.23, 1.98]
Red firm’s distribution cost ($1000/mi) 0.68
[0.02, 0.80]
Blue firm’s fixed cost ($M) 0.43
[0.27, 0.55]
Red firm’s fixed cost ($M) 0.15
[0.09, 0.31]
Number of observations 1226
likelihood ratio index 0.32
s.e. are computed using bootstrap and does not include the errors from
first stage demand estimation or second stage clustering.
distribution center implies moving away from urban markets where demand is high. This
could lead to giving up profitable locations to the competitor, especially, as will be shown
below, if the competitor (Red firm) has an urban advantage. Therefore, taking into account
the strategic interactions with Red firm, the overall economies of scale is smaller in this
model.
The estimates also indicate that per unit distribution cost is lower for Red firm than for
Blue firm. However, as shown in Table 1.2, Red stores are on average further away from
their own distribution centers than Blue stores are from theirs. For example, the average per
store distribution cost in 1990 is 0.22 million dollars for Blue firm and 0.15 million dollars
for Red firm. The ratio 0.22/0.15 equals 0.68 which is the ratio of average sizes of Blue stores
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and Red stores. Thus the average per store distribution cost conditional on the size of the
store is about the same for Blue and Red firm. Moreover, the average per store distribution
cost translates to about 0.5% of sales for Blue firm and 1% for Red firm. Therefore, Blue firm
has a more efficient distribution system than Red firm, which is consistent with findings by
Bradley et al. (2002).
The average fixed cost of operating increases by 0.43 million dollars and 0.15 million
dollars per year for Blue and Red firm respectively, when population density increases from
250 (25th percentile) to 700 (50th percentile) thousands people per 5-mile radius circular
area in 1990. The average fixed cost per store in 1990 is about 1.84 and 0.62 million dollars,
or 4% or 5% of sales, for Blue and Red firm, respectively. Since 0.62/1.84 < 0.68, Red firm
has an urban advantage relative to Blue firm. This is consistent with the store characteristics
comparisons in Table 1.2.
Standard errors are computed using bootstrap over markets. They do not include
estimation errors of demand in the first stage or clustering errors in the second stage. I
am currently working on including those errors in the standard errors of the structural
estimates using a simulation method. See Appendix II for details of the simulation method.
2.3 Counterfactual I: Preemptive entry
In this section, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to examine the impact of preemptive
motives on discount retailers’ entry decisions. I remove preemptive motives using a one-
period deviation method and compare firms’ optimal response to that of the equilibrium
outcome with preemption. In other words, what the optimal entry decisions would be if the
firm did not need to preempt. I find that preemptive incentives are important to firms’ entry
decisions and that they lead to an average loss of production efficiency of about 1 million
dollars per store, measured by combined sum of current and future profits of the two firms.
It is hard to identify preemptive incentives because they arise in a complex dynamic
setting. For preemptive motives to arise, both dynamic optimization and strategic interac-
tions between firms have to be allowed. In such settings, for example, firm j optimizes over
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three sets of variables: current state (sjt, s jt) which I refer to as ‘static competition’, {sjt}t>t
which is the possible state of j and where economies of scale comes from, and {s jt}t>t
which is the opponent’s possible state in the future and where preemption comes from.
Moreover, as preemption is a motive for acting rather than an action, it cannot be directly
observed by the econometrician. Given the complex setting in which preemption arises and
its unobserved nature, it is often hard to separate it from static competition between players,
incentives to optimize dynamically or unobserved market characteristics. Furthermore,
the evaluation of efficiency loss requires that the game setting in the counterfactual not
drastically differ from the original setting such that payoffs are comparable under the two
settings. Thus solving a different game in which preemption incentives are removed would
not be appropriate for the purpose of this counterfactual analysis.
Next, I introduce a formal definition of preemption and present a one-period deviation
method that separates preemptive motives from static competition and leads to simple
payoff comparisons. I define the preemptive incentives of firm j entering a location l to
be the change in Pr(aljt|st) in response to Pr(al jt0 |st) in equilibrium, where Pr(aljt|st) is the
choice probability of firm j entering location l at state st in equilibrium, and Pr(al jt0 |st) is the
same probability for  j in period t0, t0 > t. In other words, preemptive incentives measure
how much, in equilibrium, firm j’s likelihood of entering location l today is impacted by
its opponent’s likelihood of entering the same location in the future, holding static profits
constant.
The one period deviation method attempts to measure the change in Pr(aljt|st) when
Pr(al jt0 |st) is set to zero. The idea is the following: for each of Blue’s observed choices,
remove those choices from Red firm’s choice set for one period. Thus Blue firm knows Red
would not be allowed to enter those locations for one period. Then I investigate if Blue
firm has profitable deviations by delaying entry at those locations. Specifically, I solve the
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following equation to compute the choice probabilities of Blue without preemption,
V(sjmt, s jmt) = max
ajmt2Amt
⇢ t+8
Â
t=t
bt t Â
s jmt
Â
sjmt
EV(sjmt, s jmt)P(sjmt|sjmt + ajmt, s jmt)
P(s jmt|sjmt + ajmt, s jmt)|a jmt 6= aobsjmt+1
 
(2.3.1)
s.t.
L¯mt
Â
l=1
aljmt  Bjmt,
where aobsjmt+1 is Blue’s observed choice in period t. Note the market level budget constraint
is held fixed, so that Blue firm is not fully optimizing. Restricting a jmt 6= aobsjmt+1 gives Blue
firm an advantage over the set of locations in a jmt and the firm’s payoff is at least as high
as in the original equilibrium. Thus relaxing the market budget L¯mt would only lead to
higher payoff. As a result, if Blue firm’s payoff increases by solving Equation (2.3.1), the
amount of payoff increase is a lower bound, i.e. the impact of preemptive incentives shown
by the above procedure is a lower bound.
For the opponent, Red firm, the optimization problem is the same as in (2.3.1) with j
and  j switched. If Blue firm’s choice probabilities stay the same, Red firm would also stay
in the original equilibrium. If Blue firm deviates, Red firm is allowed to respond. Note that
in this case, the market budget L¯mt is also held fixed for Red firm. This does not bias the
result. Red firm is deprived by being forced to choose from a smaller set of locations for one
period. If Blue firm were to deviate and delay entry, and Red firm were fully optimizing, it
would switch away to other markets, inducing a weaker presence in the current market. This
would lead to higher payoff for Blue firm. Therefore the impact of preemptive incentives
measured in this experiment is a lower bound.
Results are presented in Table 2.5. I compute the choice probabilities of Blue firm entering
the observed locations when preemptive incentives are removed for one period. For cases in
which it is profitable for Blue firm to deviate from the original equilibrium, I compute the
payoff increase from the original equilibrium payoff. Out of 1278 locations, there are 425
locations at which preemption is observed in this experiment. There is profitable deviation
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Table 2.5: Preemption: one period deviation of Blue firm
Choice probabilities and payoffs
Average payoff increase($M) 0.86
Average choice probability decrease 0.14
Number of delayed entries 425
Total number of obs. 1278
Number of Blue stores out of 425 392
Efficiency loss ($M) 397
for Blue firm to delay entry when those choices are taken out of Red’s choice set for one
period. For those 425 locations where preemption is observed, average choice probability
decreases by 0.14 compared to the choice probabilities in the original equilibrium. Blue
firm’s payoff could increase by an average of 0.86 million dollars for each delayed entry,
which is about a small store’s one year profits.
Then I study loss production efficiency due to preemption. Since I do not have enough
data to conduct total welfare analysis, in the current counterfactual, I compute efficiency
loss from firms’ perspectives only, by examining the change of sum of expected current and
future profits of both firms. Results are shown in the last two rows of Table 2.5. Out of
the 425 locations, there are 392 locations where the expected total payoff of Blue and Red
firm is higher in the counterfactual than in the original equilibrium. These are the locations
at which the higher payoff of Blue firm in the counterfactual is enough to compensate the
lower payoff of Red firm due to its restricted choice set in one period. The total amount of
payoff increase is almost 397 million dollars. On average, the efficiency loss per location is
1.01 million dollars, which is about the annual profit of a small-to-median size store. For
the reasons discussed above, it is a lower bound of the efficiency loss in consequence of
preemption. The market level budgets are held fixed and firms are not fully optimizing.
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Table 2.6: Preemption vs. no preemption: location comparison
Characteristics of preemption and no preemption locations
Preemption No preemption
Distance to Blue DC (mi) 217.94 208.50
Distance to Red DC (mi) 273.22 287.35
Total Store density 24.62 22.56
Blue store density 12.14 11.55
Population density (1000) 175.48 172.12
Number of observations 425 853
From the perspective of the production side, preemption results in a substantial loss of
production efficiency.
Next I investigate why evidence of preemption is found at 425 locations but not at
others. One reason could be that preemption may not always be profitable. I compare the
two sets of locations in Table 2.6 and refer to them as preemption and non-preemption
locations. First of all, distance to Blue’s distribution center is smaller for the non-preemption
stores than for the preemption stores. The opposite is true for distance to Red’s distribution
centers. This is consistent with the motives of preemption in the current experiment. Since
preemption is more profitable at locations where the opponent is more likely to enter in the
future, those locations are likely to be closer to Red distribution centers. On the other hand,
delaying entry at these locations would mean giving up current profits, hence it is more
likely to observe preemption in the current experiment at locations where current profits
are low. This is consistent with longer distance to Blue’s distribution center. Therefore, in
the current one-period deviation experiment, it is more likely to observe preemption at
locations that are closer to Red distribution center and further away from Blue distribution
center. Moreover, preemption stores also tend to locate in areas with higher store density
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Table 2.7: Preemption: response of Red firm if Blue did not enter
Change of choice probabilities and payoff
Average payoff increase($M) 2.99
Probability of entry 0.77
Number of entries 472
Total number of obs. 1278
and higher population density. This is also consistent with the fact that those are the areas
that Red store is more likely to enter.
Finally, I compute the one-period deviation for Red firm. In this experiment, Blue firm
is assumed to stay away from its observed choices for one period and Red firm is given
the opportunity of choosing from those locations in the next period. I examine if Red firm
would choose to enter those locations, and if so how much its payoff would increase. In this
case, Red firm’s budget constraint for each market is allowed to adjust, since in the original
equilibrium Red firm may not have entered any location in the same market. However, this
is not computationally burdensome since each market is evaluated independently in this
experiment. For example, when evaluating Red firm’s deviation in market m, all the other
markets  m are held fixed at the original equilibrium. Thus, to determine if it is profitable,
the payoff of deviation is compared to the median expected payoff of  m markets.
The results are presented in Table 2.7. There is about one third of the locations where it
is profitable for Red firm to enter right away, had Blue firm stayed out of those locations.
The average probability of entry is 0.77. The average payoff increase is 2.99 million dollars
for each location, which is about a big store’s one year profits.
In the current literature, there are two methods of identifying preemption using empirical
analysis. The first method, used in Schmidt-Dengler (2006), separates preemption by solving
a pre-commitment game following the theoretical work of Reinganum (1981). In the pre-
commitment game, firms make the entry decision in the first period for the following T
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periods and commit to it. The problem of this approach is two-fold. First, it does not
exclude preemption completely. It prohibits a firm from responding instantaneously to the
opponent’s action, but the firm is still optimizing in period 1 taking into account the possible
actions of the opponent in the future. Second, since pre-commitment games demand a
different setting and lead to completely different equilibria, it is difficult to compare payoffs
with the ones in the original game.
The second method is to solve a single agent’s dynamic problem, as in Igami and Yang
(2014). Applying their method in the current setting, Red firm would make entry decisions
assuming Blue firm would not enter any market in any period. From Blue firm’s perspective,
Red firm has become a part of nature and does not respond to Blue’s actions, and therefore
cannot be preempted. Thus Blue firm solves a single agent’s dynamic optimization problem.
This experiment does not properly separate preemptive incentives since it also precludes
Red firm from responding to Blue firm’s actions in the current period, i.e. it prohibits static
competition. Setting preemptive motives motives apart, it is not clear why, when Blue’s
entry is observed, Red firm should optimize assuming Blue firm is not entering any market.
2.4 Counterfactual II: Subsidy Policy after Red Firm Exits
Red firm started exiting in many markets by closing stores in 2000. It has closed more than
1000 stores in the past 15 years. The store closings have a big impact on local economies
(Shoag and Veuger, 2014). Local governments have proposed to subsidize Red firm to stay
or other retailers such as Blue firm to enter. For example, Buffalo, NY proposed a 400,000
dollar subsidy for Red firm to stay2. Rolling Meadows, IL managed to subsidize Blue firm
to enter after their Red store closed3. However, lots of ex-Red retail slots remained empty
years after Red firm’s exit. The example of Rockledge, FL I have mentioned. Indiana Harbor
2Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/26/sears-closes-cities_n_1231326.
html
3Source: Good Jobs First and Corporate Research Project
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Beach, FL is another example4. The retail space of the former Red store stayed empty for 12
years. Therefore, it seems important for policy makers to better understand the impact of
government subsidies on retailer’s entry decisions. The current entry model can be used to
answer this question. It is also important to consider the welfare loss due to the closing of
stores. Although I do not have enough data to conduct total welfare analysis, I compute
the loss of consumer drive time due to store closings and compare it to the size of the
observed subsidies. This section attempts to answer those two questions by computing
payoff differences between ex-Red locations and the rest of potential Blue firm’s locations
and deriving welfare loss to consumers caused by higher travel cost of shopping.
First, I compute the expected payoff of Blue firm entering each ex-Red locations and
compare it to the expected payoff of Blue firm entering each of the other potential locations
for each period between year 2000 and 2003. There are 96 Red store closings in those four
years and the number of potential locations is 815. I refer to the difference between the payoff
of the median store in the two groups as the ‘subsidy’, since it is the amount of extra payoff
needed for the ex-Red locations to become as profitable as the other potential locations.
Then I compute subsidies separately for two sub-periods: 2000-2001, and 2002-2003. The
difference between those two sub-periods is that between 2000 and 2001, Red firm was still
expanding, but beginning in 2002 the expansion stopped. This makes a difference for Blue
firm’s incentives to enter ex-Red locations. In the first sub period, it is clear that Blue firm
knew that Red firm would not re-enter at ex-Red locations after the store closings, which
removes the preemptive motives for Blue to enter those locations, compared with other
potential locations. On the other hand, in the second sub-period, there is no preemptive
motive for Blue firm at any potential location including the ex-Red ones since the expansion
of Red firm has stopped. Thus it does not make the ex-Red locations less favorable, as in
the first sub-period.
Results are reported in row 1 of Table 2.8. The median size of subsidies in the period
4Source: http://www.floridatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/27/
kmart-goes-next/13197001/
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Table 2.8: Subsidies before and after Red firm stops expanding
Average subsidies per store
Total 2000-2001 2002-2003
Median predicted subsidy ($M) 3.21 5.13 1.29
Number of subsidies  0.5M per period 5.5 3.5 7.5
between 2000 and 2003 is 3.21 million dollars per store. The same measure is higher for
period 2000 and 2001 when Red firm is still expanding: 5.13 million dollars per store. The
stop of Red firm’s expansion makes ex-Red locations less unattractive compared to other
potential locations, with a median subsidy amount of 1.29 million dollars per store. The
difference between the subsidies needed for Blue to enter in the two sub-periods gives
one explanation to why some retail slots remained empty for years after a store closing.
The preemptive motives lead to the unattractiveness of those locations compared to other
potential locations.
To better interpret the sizes of the subsidies, I compare them to the size of observed
subsidies given to Blue firm between 2000 and 2014. The subsidy data is obtained from
goodjobsfirst.org. Although the list of subsidies is incomplete and some of the subsidy sizes
are approximated, it gives a general sense of the size of the subsidies. The average size
is about 0.5 million dollars. Accordingly, I count the number of ex-Red locations whose
payoffs are less than half a million dollar lower than the payoff of the median potential
location that has never been entered by either firm. Row 2 of Table 2.8 reports the results.
On average, there are 5.5 ex-Red locations per period that Blue firm would enter with a
subsidy of 0.5 million dollars. The number drops to 3.5 for the period of 2000-2001, while an
increase of 4 locations period is observed for the period of 2002-2003. Overall, the observed
average subsidy does not have a big impact on Blue firm’s entry at locations where Red
firm exited.
Lastly, I examine the welfare loss of consumers due to increased travel time to discount
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Table 2.9: Consumer welfare loss due to store closings
Consumer drive time loss per store per year
Total 2000-2001 2002-2003
Distance per person (mi) 4.05 4.10 3.99
Total distance (105mi) 8.70 9.80 7.60
Total welfare loss ($M) 1.26 1.42 1.10
shops when Red stores close. This is not expected to measure the total welfare change
due to store closings. Other factors such as employment, impact on small businesses, local
government income are also affected by exits of big box retail stores (Basker, 2007,Jia, 2008).
However, this analysis still helps to get a sense of whether, in general, the welfare loss is
comparable to the size of subsidies. I use the demand model to compute the change of
distance between a consumer and a store in the consumer’s choice set due to each of Red
store’s closings. Note some consumers may switch to the outside option after a Red store
closes. For those consumers, I assume the distance traveled to the outside option to be the
average distance travelled by a consumer to a discount retail store, 15 miles. This measure
comes from the industry survey data collected by Fox et al. (2004).
Table 2.9 reports the results. The average travel distance per person increases by
4.05 miles between 2000 and 2003, while the total distance increases by 870 thousands
miles. The total welfare loss per year is computed using the following formula: total
distance/40mph⇥7.25(federal min. wage)⇥10 trips⇥2(round trip)/2.5(avg. household size).
Total distance divided by driving speed of 40 mile per hour is the total time of travel which
is multiplied by the federal minimum wage to get the dollar value. I assume a consumer
makes 10 trips per year to a discount store. Given the estimated annual spending is $2444,
it seems reasonable to assume she spends about $240 on each trip. 10 trips per year is
also much lower than the estimate by Fox et al. (2004) of visiting a discount store every
two weeks, which squares with the goal of finding a lower bound for consumer welfare
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loss. Then the number is multiplied by 2 to account for round trips and divided by the
average household size from census data, assuming one person shops for each household.
The total welfare loss amounts to 1.26 million dollars. Although it is much smaller than
the average subsidy size of 3.21 million dollars, the break down of 1.10 million dollars for
period 2002-2003 is very close to the 1.29 million dollar subsidy for this period. Therefore,
welfare loss to consumers due to store closings can be substantial and can make the subsidy
on entry worthwhile.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies how multi-store retail chains make entry decisions, with a special
emphasis on the impact of preemptive incentives.
The study is carried out in a dynamic duopoly model in which firms make entry decisions
at spatially interdependent locations. It is shown that the model can be made tractable by
applying two-stage budgeting and separability. Instead of using census geographic units,
market divisions are inferred using machine learning tools built on separability conditions,
so that the spatial interdependence across store locations is preserved. The estimation is
carried out by solving the game using backwards induction and applying a ‘rolling window’
approximation to compute the value function. This model and this estimation method can
be applied to other retail industries or sectors in which network effects or cost sharing are
present. More generally, the application of machine learning tools in structural estimation
and its impact on inference is an interesting direction for future research.
Counterfactual analyses are also conducted. The results suggest that preemptive in-
centives are important in multi-store retailers entry decisions and that they can lead to
substantial efficiency loss. When a retailer exits a market, as frequently observed in the
recent crisis, the store location becomes less attractive to other retailers due to the absence
of preemptive incentives. In these cases, although consumer welfare loss from the store
closings can be significant, standard government subsidies prove insufficient to encourage
entry. The framework presented here can be used to assess other public policy issues that
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arise in those industries the model can be applied to.
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Chapter 3
Inference for Misspecified Models
with Fixed Regressors 1
3.1 Introduction
Following the seminal work by Eicker (1967), Huber (1967) and White (1980ab, 1982), re-
searchers estimating regression functions routinely report standard errors that are robust to
misspecification of the models that are being estimated. Müller (2013) gave the correspond-
ing confidence intervals a Bayesian interpretation. A key feature of the approach developed
by Eicker, Huber, and White (EHW from hereon), is that in regression settings it focusses on
the best linear predictor that minimizes the distance between a linear function and the true
conditional expectation, averaged over the joint distribution of all variables, with a similar
interpretation in nonlinear settings. We argue that in some regression settings it may be
more appropriate to focus on the conditional best linear predictor defined by minimizing this
distance averaged over the empirical instead of the population distribution of the covariates.
The first contribution of this paper is to extend the EHW results to such settings. For a large
class of estimators, including maximum likelihood and method of moment estimators, we
first formally characterize the generalization to nonlinear models of the conditional best
1Co-authored with Alberto Abadie and Guido Imbens
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linear predictor. We then derive a large sample approximation to the variance of the least
squares and method of moments estimators relative to this conditional estimand. In general,
in misspecified models, the robust variance for the conditional estimand is smaller than
or equal to the EHW robust variance. Second, we propose a consistent estimator for this
variance so that asymptotically valid confidence intervals can be constructed. The proposed
estimator generalizes the variance estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) for
matching estimators and more generally the differencing methods used in Yatchew (1997,
1999). In correctly specified models the new variance estimator is simply an alternative to
the standard EHW robust variance estimator. In misspecified models it is the only consistent
estimator available for the asymptotic variance for the estimand conditional on covariates.
Whether conditional or unconditional estimand should be the primary focus is context
specific and we do not take the position that either the conditional or unconditional estimand
is always the appropriate one. We discuss some examples, first to clarify the distinctions
between the two estimands and, second, to make an argument for our view that in some
settings the conditional estimand, corresponding to the fixed regressor notion, is of interest.
For example, we argue that in cases where the sample is the population there is a strong
case for using the estimand conditional on at least some covariates, see also Abadie et al.
(2014). Such cases are common in economic analyses, e.g., when analysing data where the
units are all states of the United States, or all countries of the world. Most importantly, we
argue that there is a choice to be made by the researcher that has direct implications for
inference. In making this choice the researcher should bear in mind that the variance for
the conditional estimand is generally smaller than that for the population or unconditional
estimand, and thus tests for the former will generally have better power than tests for the
latter.
Note that although we focus on estimands defined in terms of the finite sample dis-
tribution of the covariates, our inference relies on large sample approximations. To focus
on the conceptual contribution of the current paper and maintain comparability with the
preceeding literature, we focus on unconditional inference.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains a heuristic discussion
of the conceptual issues raised by this article in a linear regression model setting. In
Section 3.3 we discuss the motivation for the conditional estimand. Next, in Section 3.4
we present formal results covering least squares, maximum likelihood, and method of
moments estimators. In Section 3.5 we apply the methods developed in this paper to a
data set previously analyzed by Sachs and Warner (1997) to study the relation between
country-level growth rates and government fiscal policies. In Section 3.6 we present two
simulation studies, one in a linear and one in a nonlinear setting. Section 3.7 concludes. The
appendix contains proofs.
Some people just cite papers in introductions for no reason. Anderson and Rubin (1949);
Pearson (1901); Spearman (1904).
3.2 The Conditional Best Linear Predictor
In this section we lay out some of the conceptual issues in this paper informally in the
setting of a linear regression model. In Section 3.4 we provide formal results, covering
both this linear model setting and more general cases including maximum likelihood and
method of moments.
Consider the standard linear model
Yi = X0iq + # i, (3.2.1)
with Yi the outcome of interest, Xi a K-vector of observed covariates, possibly including
an intercept, and # i an unobserved error. Let X, Y, and # be the N ⇥ K matrix with ith row
equal to X0i , the N-vector with ith element equal to Yi, and the N-vector with ith element
equal to # i, respectively. In this setting researchers have often assumed homoskedasticity,
independence of the errors terms, and Normality of the error terms,
#|X ⇠ N (0, s2 · IN),
where IN is the N ⇥ N identity matrix. Under those assumptions the exact (conditional)
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distribution of the least squares estimator
qˆ =
 
X0X
  1  X0Y  ,
is Normal:
qˆ|X ⇠ N
⇣
q, s2 · (X0X) 1
⌘
.
However, assumptions of linearity of the regression function, independence, homoskedastic-
ity, and Normality of the error terms are often unrealistic. Eicker (1967), Huber (1967), and
White (1980ab), considered the properties of the least squares estimator qˆ under substantially
weaker assumptions. For the most general case one needs to define the estimand if the
regression function is not linear. Suppose the sample (Yi,Xi)Ni=1 is a random sample from
a large population satisfying some moment restrictions. Let µ(x) = E[Yi|Xi = x] be the
conditional expectation of Yi given Xi = x, and let s2(x) be the conditional variance. Even
if this conditional expectation µ(x) is not linear, one might still wish to approximate it by
a linear function x0q, and be interested in the value of the slope coefficient of this linear
approximation. Traditionally the optimal approximation is defined as the value of q that
minimizes the expectation of the squared difference between the outcomes and the linear
approximation to the regression function. This is generally referred to as the best linear
predictor, formally defined as
qpop = argmin
q
E
h 
Yi   X0iq
 2i . (3.2.2)
Because
E
h 
Yi   X0iq
 2i
= E
h 
µ(Xi)  X0iq
 2i
+ E
⇥
s2(Xi)
⇤
,
with the last term free of dependence on q, it follows that we can characterize qpop as
qpop = argmin
q
E
h 
µ(Xi)  X0iq
 2i
=
 
E
⇥
XiX0i
⇤  1
(E [Xiµ(Xi)]) ,
which in turn shows that qpop can be interpreted as the value of q that minimizes the dis-
crepancy between the true regression function µ(x) and the linear approximation, weighted
by the population distribution of the covariates.
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The results in EHW imply that, under some regularity conditions,
p
N ·  qˆ   qpop  d ! N  0,Vpop  ,
where the asymptotic variance is
Vpop =
 
E
⇥
XiX0i
⇤  1  
E
⇥
(Yi   X0iqpop)2XiX0i
⇤   
E
⇥
XiX0i
⇤  1 . (3.2.3)
White also proposed a consistent estimator for Vpop,
Vˆpop =
 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
(Yi   X0i qˆ)2XiX0i
! 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
. (3.2.4)
Using the EHW variance estimator Vˆpop is currently the standard practice in empirical work
in economics. See Angrist and Pischke (2008) for an example and Imbens and Kolesar (2012)
for a discussion for finite sample improvements. Resampling methods such as the jackknife
and the bootstrap (Efron, 1982; Efron and Tibshirani, 1994) can also be used to construct
confidence intervals for qpop.
In this paper we explore an alternative linear approximation to the possibly nonlinear
regression function µ(x). Instead of minimizing the marginal expectation of the squared
difference between the outcomes and the regression function, we minimize this expectation
conditional on the observed covariates. Define the conditional best linear predictor qcond(X) as
qcond(X) = argmin
q
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
h 
Yi   X0iq
 2   Xi . (3.2.5)
The difference with the best linear predictor defined in (3.2.2) is that in (3.2.5) the expectation
is taken over the empirical distribution of the covariates, whereas in (3.2.2) the expectation is
taken over the population distribution of the covariates. To be explicit about the dependence
of the conditional best linear predictor on the sample values of the covariates we write
qcond(X) as a function of the matrix of covariate values X. Denoting the N-vector with i-th
element equal to µ(Xi) by µ(X), we can write qcond(X) as
qcond(X) = argmin
q
1
N
N
Â
i=1
 
µ(Xi)  X0iq
 2
=
 
X0X
  1  X0µ(X)  ,
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to stress the interpretation of qcond(X) as the best approximation to the true regression
function, now with the weights based on the empirical distribution of the covariates. Both
qpop and qcond(X) base the linear approximation to µ(x) on a minimizing of the squared
difference between the true regression function µ(x) and the linear approximation x0q. The
difference between the two approximations is solely in how they weight, as a function
of the covariates, the squared difference between the regression function and the linear
approximation for each x. The first approximation, leading to qpop, uses the population
distribution of the covariates. The second approximation, leading to qcond(X), uses the
empirical distribution of the covariates.
We defer to Section 3.3 the important question whether, and why, in a specific application,
qcond(X) rather than qpop might be the object of interest. In some applications we argue that
qpop is the estimand of interest. However, as discussed in detail in Section 3.3, we also think
that in other applications qcond(X) is of more interest than qpop. Given that the main focus
of the previous literature is on population parameters like qpop, we view the question of
inference for qcond(X) as of general interest.
Next we point out the implications of the difference between qpop and qcond(X). The first
issue to note is that for point estimation it is irrelevant whether we are interested in qpop
or qcond(X). In both cases the least squares estimator qˆ is the natural estimator. However,
for inference it does matter whether we are interested in estimating qpop or qcond(X), unless
E[#|X] = 0 and the conditional expectation is truly linear. Consider the variance of the least
squares estimator qˆ, viewed as an estimator of qcond(X). The exact (conditional) variance of
qˆ is
V
 
qˆ
  X  = E h qˆ   qcond(X)   qˆ   qcond(X) 0   Xi (3.2.6)
=
1
N
 
X0X/N
  1 1
N
N
Â
i=1
s2(Xi)XiX0i
!  
X0X/N
  1 .
Directly comparing the normalized variance N · V(qˆ|X) to the EHW variance Vpop is
complicated by the fact that N ·V(qˆ|X) is a conditional variance, rather than an asymptotic
variance like Vpop. We therefore look at the unconditional variance of the ols estimator qˆ
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as an estimator of qcond(X). Because qˆ is unbiased for qcond(X), it follows that the marginal
variance is the expected value of the conditional variance. Under random sampling the
asymptotic variance is
Vcond = plim
 
N ·V(qˆ|X)  =  E ⇥XiX0i⇤  1  E ⇥s2(Xi)XiX0i⇤   E ⇥XiX0i⇤  1 , (3.2.7)
and we have, under regularity conditions, a large sample approximation to the distribution
of
p
N ·  qˆ   qcond(X) :
p
N ·  qˆ   qcond(X)  d ! N (0,Vcond) .
The key difference between the robust variance Vpop proposed by White and the robust
variance Vcond arises from the difference between the conditional variance s2(Xi) in (3.2.7)
and the expectation of the squared residual E[(Yi   X0iqpop)2|Xi] in (3.2.3). The latter is in
general larger:
E[(Yi   X0iqpop)2|Xi] = s2(Xi) + (µ(Xi)  X0iqpop)2,
where µ(Xi)  X0iqpop captures the difference between the linear approximation and the
conditional expectation. For the asymptotic variances of qˆ we have:
Vpop = Vcond +V(qcond(X)), (3.2.8)
where
V(qcond(X)) = plim N ·E
h 
qcond(X)  qpop
   
qcond(X)  qpop
 0i (3.2.9)
The last expectation is over the distribution of qcond(X) as a function of X. Thus in general
Vpop exceedsVcond, and as a result inference based onVpop is conservative for qcond(X). The
difference between the two variances is the result of the misspecification in the regression
function, that is, the difference between the conditional expectation and the best linear
predictor, µ(x)  x0qpop.
The final question we address in this section is how to estimate Vcond. Simple bootstrap-
ping methods do not work (Tibshirani, 1986; Wu, 1986). The challenge is that the conditional
variance function s2(x) is generally unknown. Estimating this is straightforward in the
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case with discrete covariates. One can consistently estimate the conditional variance s2(Xi)
at each distinct value of the covariates and plug that in (3.2.7), followed by replacing the
expectations by averages over the sample. If the covariates are continuous, however, this
is not feasible. In the remainder of this discussion we focus on the continuous covariate
case. Dealing with the setting where some of the covariates are discrete is conceptually
straightforward, but would require carrying along additional notation and come at the
expense of clarity. In the continuous covariate case estimating s2(x) consistently for all x
would require nonparametric estimation involving bandwidth choices. Such an estimator
would be more complicated than the EHW robust variance estimator which simply uses
squared residuals to estimate the expectation of the squared errors. Here we build on
work by Yatchew (1997, 1999) and Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2008b,a) to develop a general
estimator for Vcond that does not require consistent estimation of s2(x), much like the EHW
variance estimator does not consistently estimate E[(Yi   X0iqpop)2|Xi = x] for all x. Let
VX be the covariance matrix of X, VX = ÂNi=1(Xi   X)(Xi   X)0/N, where X = ÂNi=1 Xi/N.
Next define `X(i) to be the index of the unit closest to i in terms of X:
`X(i) = arg min
j2{1,...,N},j 6=i
  Xi   Xj   , (3.2.10)
where the norm we use is the Mahalanobis distance, kxk = x0V 1X x, although others could
be used. Then our proposed variance estimator is
bVcond =
 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
(3.2.11)
·
 
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
⇣
#ˆ iXi   #ˆ`X(i)X`X(i)
⌘ ⇣
#ˆ iXi   #ˆ`X(i)X`X(i)
⌘0! · 1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
.
In Section 3.4 we show in a more general setting that this variance estimator is consistent
for Vcond. An alternative estimator for Vcond exploits the fact that the conditional variance
of # iXi conditional on Xi is the same as Xi times the conditional variance of # i given Xi,
eVcond =
 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
·
 
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
⇣
#ˆ i   #ˆ`X(i)
⌘2
XiX0i
!
·
 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
.
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Although in this linear regression case with conditioning on all covariates both bVcond andeVcond are consistent for Vcond, for nonlinear settings, or with conditioning on a subset of
the covariates, only the first estimator bVcond generalizes. To be specific, suppose that the
covariate vector Xi can be partitioned as Xi = (X01i,X2i)0 and correspondingly X = (X1,X2),
and suppose we wish to estimate the variance conditional on X1 only. In this case the
probability limit of the normalized variance for the least squares estimator is
Vcond =
 
E
⇥
XiX0i
⇤  1
(E [V (# iXi|X1i)])
 
E
⇥
XiX0i
⇤  1 . (3.2.12)
Our proposed estimator for this conditional variance is
bVcond =
 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
(3.2.13)
·
 
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
⇣
#ˆ iXi   #ˆ`X1 (i)X`X1 (i)
⌘ ⇣
#ˆ iXi   #ˆ`X1 (i)X`X1 (i)
⌘0! · 1
N
N
Â
i=1
XiX0i
! 1
.
This estimator is consistent for the conditional variance Vcond. In contrast, replacing #ˆ`X(i) by
#ˆ`X1 (i)
in the expression for eVcond would not lead to a consistent estimator for the variance.
Although the asymptotic variance Vcond is less than or equal to the EHW variance Vpop,
this need not hold for the estimators. In finite samples it may well be the case that bVcond
is larger than bVpop. We study the finite sample behavior of the variance estimator in a
simulation study in Section 3.6.
In the remainder of this paper we will generalize the results in this section to maximum
likelihood and method of moments settings, and state formal results concerning the large
sample properties of the variance estimators. In the general settings the estimators are no
longer least squares estimators, and we will modify the terminology to reflect this. We
will use qpop for population estimands that generalize the best linear predictor qpop in the
regression case, and qcond for the conditional version that generalizes the conditional best
linear predictor qcond in the regression case.
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3.3 Motivation for Conditional Estimands
In this section we address the question whether, when, and why the estimand conditional on
the covariates may be of interest. We emphatically do not wish to argue that the conditional
estimand is the appropriate object of interest in all cases. Rather, we wish to make the
case, through two examples, that it depends on the context what the appropriate object is,
and that in some settings the conditional best linear predictor is more appropriate than the
standard unconditional estimand.
One way to frame the question is in terms of different repeated sampling perspectives
one can take. We can consider the distribution of the least squares estimator over repeated
samples where we redraw the pairs Xi and Yi (the random regressor case), or we can
consider the distribution over repeated samples where we keep the values of Xi fixed and
only redraw the Yi (the fixed regressor case). Under general misspecification both the mean
and variance of these two distributions of the estimator will differ. The population estimand
qpop is the approximate (in a large sample sense) average over the repeated samples when
we redraw both Xi and Yi, and qcond(X) is the approximate average over the repeated
samples where Xi is held fixed. Many introductory treatments of regression analysis briefly
introduce the fixed and random regressor concepts, with a variety of opinions on what the
most relevant perspective is. Wooldridge writes that “reliance on fixed regressors ... can
have unintended consequences. ... Because our focus is on asymptotic analysis, we have the
luxury of allowing for random explanatory variables throughout the book” (Wooldridge,
2002, p.10-11). Goldberger (1991) takes a different position, assuming “X nonstochastic,
which says that the elements of X are constants, that is, degenerate random variables.
Their values are fixed in repeated samples ...” (Goldberger, p. 164). Van der Vaart (2000)
writes “We assume that the independent variables are a random sample in order to fit the
example in our i.i.d. notation, but the analysis could be carried out conditionally as well.”
(VanderVaart, p. 57), and Gelman and Hill (2006) focus on the fixed regressor perspective,
writing “This book follows the usual approach of setting up regression models in the
measurement-error framework (y = a+ bx+ e), with the sampling interpretation implicit
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in that the errors e1, . . . , en, can be considered as a random sample from a distribution”
(Gelman and Hill, p.17). These discussions are in the context of correctly specified regression
models, however, where the averages of the distributions under the two repeated sampling
perspectives coincide, and their variances agree in large samples. A point that has not
received attention in the literature is that under general misspecifiaction, the random versus
fixed regressor distinction has implications for inference that do not vanish with the sample
size.
Another point is that the sole difference between the population and conditional esti-
mands is the weight function used to measure the difference between the model and the
true data generating process. For the population estimand the weight function depends on
the population distribution of the potential conditioning variables, and for the conditional
estimand it is the sample distribution of these variables. Because the population distribution
of these variables, unlike the sample distribution, is unknown, in general there is more
uncertainty about the population estimand. Thus, focusing on the conditional estimand
qcond generally leads to smaller standard errors than focusing on the population estimand
qpop.
Example I (Convenience Sample)
In the first example we want to make the case that sometimes there is intrinsically no
more interest in qpop than qcond because neither the weighting scheme corresponding to
the population distribution, nor the weighting scheme corresponding to the empirical
distribution function, is obviously of primary interest.
Consider the study of lottery winners by Imbens et al. (2001). Imbens, Rubin and
Sacerdote surveyed individuals who won large prizes in the lottery. Using a standard life-
cycle model of labor supply they focus on linear regressions of subsequent labor earnings
on the annual prize and some additional covariates including prior earnings. The coefficient
on the prize in this linear regression can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to
consume out of unearned income, an economically meaningful parameter (e.g., Pencavel,
1986). Even if the conditional expectation as a function of the prize is nonlinear, it may still
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be interesting to focus on the coefficient in the linear regression, partly because it facilitates
comparison across studies. The question is whether the linear approximation should be
based on weighting the squared difference between the true regression function and the
linear predictor by the population or empirical distribution of lottery prizes. There does not
appear to be a strong substantive argument for preferring one weighting function (and thus
the corresponding estimand) over the other. ⇤
Example II (Experimental Design)
Karlan and List (2007) carried out an experimental evaluation of incentives for charitable
giving. Among the results Karlan and List report are probit regression estimates where the
object of interest is the regression coefficient on the indicator for being offered a matching
incentive for charitable giving. The specification of the probit regression function also
includes characteristics of the matching incentives.
In this case the difference between Vpop and Vcond is that Vpop takes into account
sampling variation in qˆ due to variation in the sample values of the matching incentives over
the repeated samples, whereas Vcond conditions on these values. Given that the distribution
of these incentives in this experiment is fixed by the researchers there appears to be no
reason to take this uncertainty into account, and we submit that the appropriate measure of
uncertainty is Vcond rather than Vpop. ⇤
3.4 Inference for Conditional Estimands
In this section we present the main formal results of the paper, covering linear regression,
maximum likelihood, and method of moments estimators. We cover settings where we
condition on the full set of regressors as well as cases where we condition on a subset of
the regressors. We focus on the just-identified case, although the results can be extended
to over-identified generalized method of moments settings, for example using empirical
likelihood approaches (e.g., Qin and Lawless, 1994; Imbens, 1997; Imbens et al., 1998; and
Newey and Smith, 2004).
Suppose we have a random sample of size N of a pair of random vectors, (Xi,Yi),
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i = 1, . . . ,N. Let X and Y be the N⇥KX and N⇥KY matrices with i-th rows equal to X0i and
Y0i respectively. The distinction between Xi and Yi is that we may wish to condition on the
Xi in defining the estimand. We are interested in a finite dimensional parameter q, defined
in general as some function of the joint distribution of (Xi,Yi). Under some statistical model
it follows that
E [y(Yi,Xi, q)] = 0, (3.4.1)
with the dimension of q equal to that of y. The model may have additional implications
beyond this moment restriction, but these are not used for estimation. For example, it may
be the case that the conditional moment has expectation zero,
E [y(Yi,Xi, q)|Xi] = 0.
Alternatively, we may have specified the joint distribution of Yi and Xi, in which case
y(y, x, q) could equal to the score function. In that case the model has the additional
implication that minus the expected value of the derivatives of y(y, x, q) with respect to q
is equal to the expected value of the second moments of y(y, x, q). Based only on (3.4.1),
and not on any other implications of the motivating model, we may wish to estimate q by qˆ,
which satisfies
1
N
N
Â
i=1
y(Yi,Xi, qˆ) = 0.
We are interested in the properties of the estimator qˆ under general misspecification of the
model that motivated the moment restriction.
The standard approach to generalized method of moments (GMM) and empirical
likelihood estimation (Hansen, 1984; Newey and McFadden, 1994; Wooldridge, 2002; Qin
and Lawless, 1993; Imbens, Johnson and Spady, 1997) focuses on the value qpop that solves
E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)
⇤
= 0.
If the pairs (Xi,Yi), for i = 1, . . . ,N are independent and identically distributed, then under
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regularity conditions,
p
N
 
qˆ   qpop
  d ! N  0,Vgmm,pop  , where Vgmm,pop = ⇣G0D 1popG⌘ 1 ,
with
G = E

∂
∂q0
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)
 
, and Dpop = E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0
⇤
.
Now we focus on the conditional estimand, where we condition on X. Define qcond(X)
as the solution to
E
"
N
Â
i=1
y(Yi,Xi, q)
     X
#
= 0. (3.4.2)
Note that implicitly qcond is a function of X. If the original model implied that the conditional
expectation of y(Yi,Xi, q) given Xi is equal to zero, then qcond = qpop, but this need not
hold in general. The motivation for the estimand is the same as in the best-linear-predictor
case. In cases where the model implies a conditional moment restriction, but we are
concerned about misspecification, we may wish to focus on the value for q that minimizes
the discrepancy between E[y(Yi,Xi, q)|Xi] and zero. We can weight the discrepancy by
the population distribution of the Xi’s, or by the empirical distribution. The conditional
estimand corresponds to the case where the weights are based on the empirical distribution
function.
We make the following assumptions. These are closely related to standard assumptions
used for establishing asymptotic properties for moment-based estimators. See for example
Newey and McFadden (1994).
Assumption 3.1 (Yi,Xi), for i = 1, . . . ,N, are independent and identically distributed.
Assumption 3.2 (i) For some compact Q ⇢ RK, there is a unique value, qpop 2 Q, such that
E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)] = 0; (ii) y(Y,X, q) is continuous at each q 2 Q with probability one; (iii)
E[supq2Q ky(Yi,Xi, q)k] < •.
Theorem 3.1 If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold, then:
qˆ   qpop p! 0,
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and
qˆ   qcond(X) p! 0.
All proofs are given in the appendix.
Assumption 3.3 (i) qpop is an interior point of Q; (ii) y(y, x, q) is continuously differentiable
with respect to q in an open neighborhood B of qpop; (iii) E[ky(Yi,Xi, qpop)k2] < •; (iv)
E[supq2B k∂y(Yi,Xi, q)/∂q0k] < •; (v) G = E[∂y(Yi,Xi, qpop)/∂q0] is nonsingular.
Theorem 3.2 Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3,
p
N(qˆ   qpop) d! N(0, G 1Dpop(G 1)0),
where Dpop = E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0] and
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)) d! N(0, G 1Dcond(G 1)0),
where Dcond = E[V(y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi)].
Corollary 3.1 Under the conditions of Theorem 3.2, if E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi = x] = 0 for almost
all x in the support of Xi, then
p
N(qˆ   qpop) and
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)) have the same asymptotic
distribution.
Assumption 3.3(ii) requires differentiability of y(y, x, q). This assumption can, however, be
replaced by asymptotic equicontinuity conditions as in Huber (1967), Pakes and Pollard
(1989), Andrews (1994), or Newey and McFadden (1994). In Appendix C.2 we show that the
results of Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.1 hold under an asymptotic equicontinuity condition,
with the only change that for the non-differentiable case we have G = ∂E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)]/∂q0.
Example VI below discusses the case of L1 (quantile) regression. Notice that the consistency
result in Theorem 3.1 does not require everywhere differentiability of y(y, x, q).
We now discuss two additional examples that illustrate the differences between the large
sample variances of
p
N(qˆ   qpop) and
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)). The first example is related to
the discussion in Chow (1984).
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Example III (Maximum Likelihood Estimation)
Suppose we specify the conditional distribution of Yi given Xi as f (y|x; q). We estimate the
model by maximum likelihood:
qˆ = argmax
q
N
Â
i=1
ln f (Yi|Xi; q).
The normalized asymptotic variance under correct specification, and under some regularity
conditions, is equal to the inverse of the information matrix I 1q , where
Iq =  E

∂2
∂q∂q0
ln f (Yi|Xi; q)
 
= E

∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi; q) · ∂∂q ln f (Yi|Xi; q)
0
 
.
Huber (1967) and White (1982) analyzed the properties of the maximum likelihood estimator
under general misspecification of the conditional density. Let
qpop = argmax
q
E [ln f (Yi|Xi; q)] .
They showed that under general misspecification,
qˆ
p ! qpop, and
p
N ·  qˆ   qpop  d ! N ⇣0, G 1DpopG 1⌘ ,
with
G =  E

∂2
∂q∂q0
ln f (Yi|Xi; qpop)
 
, Dpop = E

∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi; qpop) · ∂∂q ln f (Yi|Xi; qpop)
0
 
.
The conditional version of the estimand under general misspecification is
qcond(X) = argmax
q
N
Â
i=1
E [ ln f (Yi|Xi; q)|Xi] ,
where the expectation is taken only over the conditional distribution of Yi given Xi. Theorem
3.2 implies that
p
N ·  qˆ   qcond(X)  d ! N ⇣0, G 1DcondG 1⌘ ,
where
Dcond = E

V
✓
∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi, qpop)
    Xi◆  .
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If the model is correctly specified, then Dpop = Dcond. If the model is misspecified, then
E

∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi, qpop)
 
= 0, E

∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi, qpop)
    Xi = x  6= 0,
for x in a set of positive probability. For such x,
E

∂
∂q
ln f (Yi|Xi; qpop) · ∂∂q ln f (Yi|Xi; qpop)
0
    Xi = x    V✓ ∂∂q ln f (Yi|Xi, qpop)
    Xi = x◆ ,
implying that in general Dpop   Dcond is positive semi-definite. ⇤
Example IV (Quantile Regression)
Suppose that the t-th conditional quantile of Yi given Xi is a linear function, so E[I[YiX0iqpop]|Xi =
x] = t, where IA is the indicator function for the event A. Therefore, E[Xi(I[YiX0iqpop]  t)] =
0. The quantile regression estimator qˆ (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978) solves the analogous
sample moment restrictions:      1N NÂi=1Xi(I[YiX0i qˆ]   t)
      = op(1/pN) (3.4.3)
(see Powell, 1984). If the quantile regression model is misspecified, so E[I[YiX0iqpop]|Xi =
x] 6= t for some x in a set of positive probability, there will generally still be a value qpop
that solves (3.4.3). Under regularity conditions the quantile regression estimator estimates
that parameter, and its distribution is
p
N(qˆ   qpop) p! N (0, G 1DpopG 1),
where
G = E[ fY|X=Xi(X
0
iqpop)XiX
0
i ]
and
Dpop = E[Xi(I[Yi X0iqpop0]   t)2X0i ]
(see, for example, Angrist et al. (2006), or Appendix C.3). Angrist, Chernozhukov, and
Fernández-Val (2006) provide an interpretation of quantile regression under misspecification.
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In Appendix C.3 we show that, in addition:
p
N(qˆ   q(X)) p! N (0, G 1DcondG 1),
where
Dcond = E[XiV(I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi)X0i ].
Because E[(I[Yi X0iqpop0]  t)2|Xi]   V(I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi), it follows that Dpop Dcond is positive
semi-definite. Under correct specification, E[I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi] = t, so E[(I[Yi X0iq0]  t)2|Xi] =
V(I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi) = t(1  t) and Dcond = Dpop. ⇤
Next, we consider estimation of the variance in the general case. Estimation of G is the
same as for the population estimand:
Gˆ =
1
N
N
Â
i=1
∂
∂q0
y(Yi,Xi, qˆ).
The key question concerns estimation of Dcond. Our proposed estimator matches each unit
to the closest unit in terms of Xi, and then differences the values of the moment function:
Dˆcond =
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
⇣
y(Yi,Xi, qˆ)  y(Y`X(i),X`X(i), qˆ)
⌘ ⇣
y(Yi,Xi, qˆ)  y(Y`X(i),X`X(i), qˆ)
⌘0
,
where `X(i) is as defined in (3.2.10). We then combine these estimates to get an estimator
for the variance of the conditional estimand:
bVgmm,cond = Gˆ 1Dˆ(Gˆ 1)0.
Assumption 3.4 The support of Xi is compact. The conditional expectationE[yk(Yi,Xi, q)|Xi = x]
is Lipschitz in x with constant Ck for k  4, for all q in an open neighborhood of qpop, where Ck does
not depend on q.
Theorem 3.3 (Conditional Variance for Method of Moments Estimators) Suppose
Assumptions 3.1-3.4 hold. Then
bVgmm,cond p ! Vgmm,cond.
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3.5 An Application to Cross-Country Growth Regressions
For an illustration of the methods discussed in this paper we turn to an analyis in Sachs and
Warner (1997) of the determinants of country-level growth rates. Sachs and Warner have
data for 83 countries on the county’s per capita growth rate between 1965 and 1990, and wish
to relate this outcome to country-level fiscal policies. These policies include the degree of
openness of the country (“open”) and the central government budget balance (“cgb”). Sachs
and Warner estimate a linear regression of the per capita growth rate on these variables,
also including a number of characteristics of the country such as its location relative to the
tropics and the sea (landlocked or not), and some measures of the economic conditions at
the beginning of this period, including gross domestic product in 1965 (“gdp65”).
The estimates are reported in Table 3.1, with the variables described in Table 3.2. We
calculate the EHW standard errors, as well as our proposed conditional standard errors
where the variables we condition on include all characteristics of the countries other than
the economic policy variables open, open⇥gdp65, and cgb which are directly under the
control of the government. It would appear reasonable that at least some of these variables
should be conditioned on, including whether a country is landlocked and what share of its
landmass is in the tropics.
We find that the standard errors for the key variables, the indicator for being open and
its interaction with gdp in 1965 go down by about 7%.
3.6 Two Simulation Studies
In this section we assess the small sample properties of the variance estimators. We focus
on two models, first a linear regression and second a logistic regression model.
3.6.1 A Simulation Study of a Linear Model
We consider estimating a regression function with K regressors. the first regressor, X1i, has
a mixture of a normal distribution with mean zero and unit variance, and a log normal
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Table 3.1: Cross Country Growth Regression, Dependent variable: per capita GDP growth between 1965 and
1990
bˆ
q
Vˆpop
p
Vˆcond
constant 1.66 3.08 3.03
gdp65 -1.50 0.18 0.17
open 10.91 2.76 2.56
open65 -1.08 0.35 0.33
dpop 0.69 0.40 0.45
cgb 0.115 0.025 0.023
inst 0.315 0.071 0.068
tropics -0.83 0.25 0.24
land -0.58 0.21 0.26
sxp -3.92 1.22 1.21
life 0.35 0.12 0.12
life2 -0.003 0.001 0.001
N = 83
R2 = 0.862
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Table 3.2: Description of Variables: Cross Country Growth Regression
Variable Description
dependent Average annual growth in real GDP per economically active population
variable between 1970 and 1989.
gdp65 Log of real GDP per economically active population in 1965.
open Fraction of years during the period 1965-1990 in which the country is rated
as an open economy according to the criteria in Sachs and Warner (1995).
open65 open*gdp65.
dpop Difference between the growth rate of the economically active population
(between ages 15 and 65) and growth of total population.
cgb Current revenues minus current expenditures of the central government,
expressed as a fraction of GDP.
inst Institutional quality index.
tropics Approximate proportion of land area subject to a tropical climate.
land Dummy variable that equals one if a country is landlocked.
sxp Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1970.
life Life expectancy at birth, circa 1965-1970.
life2 Life squared.
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distribution with parameters µ = 0 and s2 = 0.5. The mixture probability for the log
normal component is p. We use two values for p in the simulations, p = 0 and p = 0.1 with
the latter corresponding to a design with high leverage covariates. The remaining K   1
covariates have normal distributions with mean zero and unit variance. All covariates are
independent. We use two values for the number of covariates: K = 1 where only X1i is
present in the regression function, and K = 5 where there are four additional regressors.
We use two sample sizes, N = 50 and N = 200. The conditional distribution of Yi given
(X1i, . . . ,XKi) is Normal:
Yi|X1i, . . . ,XKi ⇠ N
 
µi, s2i
 
,
where
µi = X1i + d ·
 
X21i   1
 
, and ln s2i = 1  g · X1i.
A non-zero value for d makes the model nonlinear and implies that the linear regression
model is misspecified. We use two values for d. In the first design we fix d = 0 (correct speci-
fication), and in the second design we use a larger value, d = 1 (misspecification). A non-zero
value for g implies heteroskedasticity. We use two values for g, g = 0 (homoskedasticity)
and g = 0.5 (heteroskedasticity). With two values for each of five parameters of the design,
p 2 {0, 0.1}, K 2 {1, 5}, N 2 {50, 200}, d 2 {0, 0.1}, and g 2 {0.0.5}, we consider a total of
32 designs.
For each of the 32 designs we focus on estimating a linear regression function
Yi = q0 +
K
Â
k=1
qk · Xki + # i.
Table 3.3 presents the results, based on 50,000 replications for each design. We focus
on the coefficient on X1i, denoted by q (dropping the subscript 1 for ease of notation). For
all designs we report four coverage rates. First the coverage frequency of the conventional
(EHW standard error based) 95% confidence interval for qpop. This coverage frequency is
calculated as the frequency with which (qˆ  qpop)/
q
Vˆpop is less than 1.96 in absolute value.
Note that both qpop and qcond need to be numerically evaluated for these data generating
processes. The nominal coverage rate of the confidence intervals is 0.95. Next, the frequency
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with which the same confidence interval covers qcond, that is, the frequency with which
(qˆ   qcond(X))/
q
Vˆpop is less than 1.96 in absolute value. This should in large samples be
at least 0.95, and more than 0.95 in misspecified models according to our formal results. We
also report the coverage rates for confidence intervals based on the conditional standard
errors. Now the coverage for qpop could be less than 0.95, but the coverage for qcond(X)
should be 0.95.
In the first design (Design I) with a single covariate, 50 observations, a linear conditional
expectation and a normal regressor and homoskedasticity, both variance estimators lead
to coverage rates around 92-93%, with the EHW variance doing slightly better. With five
covariates (Design II), the difference between the two variance estimators (in favor of the
EHW variance estimator) becomes more pronounced. Having a skewed distribution for the
covariate with some high leverage values does not change the coverage rates very much
in Design III. With 200 observations (Design V), the coverage rates become closer to the
nominal coverage rates for both variance estimators. Given heteroskedasticity (Design IX),
the EHW variance estimator does substantially better with a coverage rate of 91%, whereas
the conditional variance estimator leads to confidence intervals with a coverage rate of 88%
Allowing for misspecification of the regression function (Design XVII) changes the coverage
rates substantially. The coverage rate, based on the EHW estimator, for qpop, is 90%. The
coverage rate based on the conditional variance estimator, for qcond, is much closer to the
nominal level, at 0.94.
Over the 32 designs, the worst performance of the EHW variance estimator is in Design
XX, with misspecification and high leverage covariates, 50 observations, and 5 covariates,
where the coverage rate is 79% instead of 95%. The worst performance of the conditional
variance estimator is in Design XII, with a linear model, heteroskedasticity, five covariates,
with high leverage, and 50 observations, with an actual coverage rate of 88%. It appears that
the conditional variance estimator is more sensitive to heteroskedasticity, but less sensitive
to the distribution of the covariates. Overall the worst case for the conditional variance
estimator is substantially better than for the EHW variance estimator.
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3.6.2 A Simulation Study of a Logistic Regression Model
Next, we do a similar simulation study in a nonlinear setting. Here the outcome is a binary
indicator. We estimate a logistic regression model specified as:
pr(Yi = 1|X1i, . . . ,XKi) = 11+ exp(q0 +ÂKk=1 qk · Xki)
.
The data are generated through a model where a latent index Y⇤i satisfies
Y⇤i = q0 +
K
Â
k=1
qk · Xki + # i,
and the observed outcome is the indicator that Y⇤i is non-negative:
Yi = I[Y⇤i  0].
In the base case, there are 50 observations, and # i has a logistic distribution so that the
logistic regression model is correctly specified. In this case there is a single covariate (K = 1),
q1 = 1, q0 = 0, and the covariate has a standard Normal distribution with unit variance.
We can consider combinations of five modifications, similar to those in the linear model.
First, we allow for the presence of four additional covariates (K = 5), with the additional
covariates all having independent normal distributions with zero coefficients. Second, we
change the distribution of the first covariate to include high leverage points by making it a
mixture of a standard Normal distribution and a log normal distribution with parameters
0 and 0.5, and the probability of the log normal component equal to 0.1. Third, we
change the sample size to 200. Fourth, we multiply the # i for all units by exp(1  0.5 · X1i).
In the linear case this corresponds to introducing heteroskedasticity, but here this also
implies misspecification of the logistic regression model. Finally, we directly misspecify the
regression function by changing the specification of Y⇤i to
Y⇤i = X1i +
 
X21i   1
 
+ # i.
Table 3.4 presents the results for the 32 designs generated as combinations of these
changes to the base design, based on 50,000 replications. There are some qualitative
87
differences with the simulations for the linear case. There are generally bigger differences
between the two variance estimators, Vˆcond and Vˆpop. The coverage rates for confidence
intervals, for qpop based on Vˆpop, and for qcond(X) based on Vˆcond, are closer to nominal
levels. In contrast, inference for for qcond(X) based on Vˆpop leads to confidence intervals
with substantially higher coverage, and inference for qcond based on Vˆcond(X) leads to
substantial undercoverage.
In general, inference for qcond(X) is less affected by the changes in the design than
inference for qpop. For example, the worst design for qpop is still Design XX, with both
misspecification and high leverage covariates, where the coverage rate is 0.930. For the
conditional estimand, the worst designs are those with misspecification, with coverage rates
around 0.924, still close to the nominal 0.95 level.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss inference for conditional estimands in misspecified models. Fol-
lowing the work by Eicker (1967), Huber (1967), and White (1980a,b, 1982), it is common
in empirical work to report robust standard errors. These robust standard errors are valid
for the population value of the estimator given random sampling. We show that if one
is interested in the conditional estimand, conditional on all or a subset of the variables,
robust standard errors are generally smaller than the White robust standard errors. We
derive a general characterization of the variance for the conditional estimand and propose
a consistent estimator for this variance. We argue that in some settings the conditional
estimand may be of more interest than the unconditional one.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.1: Suppose 9s0j 6= s⇤j s.t. p(s0j (s), s⇤ j(s), s) > p(s⇤j (s), s⇤ j(s), s). Since
s⇤ j and s⇤j are separable, 9m 2 {1, ...,M}, s.t. s⇤jm(sm, s⇤ jm(sm), B⇤m) 6= s0mj (s, s⇤ jm(sm), B),
and Âl2Pm pjl(s
0m
j (s), s
⇤ jm(sm), s) > Âl2Pm pjl(s
⇤
j (sm), s
⇤ jm(sm), sm). But s⇤jm is the best re-
sponse of s⇤ jm, and Dp(sj, s j, l)/Dp(sj, s j, h) does not depend on (sjn, s jn), 8l, h 2 Pm
and m 6= n. Thus there’s no profitable deviation by including sjn, 8n 6= m,
i.e. Âl2Pm pjl(s
0m
j (s), s
⇤ jm(sm), s)  Âl2Pm pjl(s⇤j (sm), s⇤ jm(sm), sm).
Proof of Theorem1.2: If all conditions are satisfied, p(s) is additively separably in {P1, · · · , PM}.
By results in Gorman (1959), {1, · · · , L} is separably in {P1, · · · , PM}.
Definition A.1 Locations {1, · · · , L}are separable in the partition {P1, · · · , PM} if
DEV(sj, s j, l)
DEV(sj, s j, h)
?(skj , sk j)|{Bjm, B jm}Mm=1, 8l, h 2 Pm, 8k /2 Pn,m 6= n,
where l, h 2 Pml , and k 2 Pmk , and
DEV(sj, s j, l) = EV(slj = 1, s
 l
j , s j) EV(slj = 0, s lj , s j).
Definition A.2 Firm j’s strategy s⇤j is separable in the partition {P1, · · · , PM} if for given s j,
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9s⇤j1, s⇤j2, · · · s⇤jM s.t.
s⇤jm(sjm, s jm, Bm) = s⇤mj (sj, s j, B),
where s⇤j =
⇣
s⇤1j , · · · , s⇤Mj
⌘
, Bm = (B⇤jm, B jm), B⇤jm = Âl2Pm a
⇤l
j , B jm = Âl2Pm a
l
 j, 8m =
1, · · · ,M, and ÂMm=1 Bm = B.
Theorem A.1 If locations {1, · · · , L} are separable in the partition {P1, · · · , PM}, there exists a
separable equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem A.1: Results follow the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem A.2 The location {1, · · · , L} is separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM} if the value function
EV(·) satisfies the following conditions,
1. Rlj(s) is additively separable in partition {P1, · · · , PM},
2. Distribution cost and fixed cost at location l is independent of zkj and x
k
j , where k 2 Pn,m 6= n,
3. hlj are independently distributed across markets.
Proof of Theorem A.2: Prove by induction. Rewrite the value function as
EV(sit, s jt) =
•
Â
t=t
bt t
 
Â
st
Ep(st)P(st|st)
!
=
•
Â
t=t
bt tEVt(st).
The first term in the outer sum, EVt(st) = Ep(st) when t = t, is separable in {P1, · · · , PM}
by Theorem 1.2. Assume EVt(st) is separable in {P1, · · · , PM} for t = T, then ÂsT Ep(sT)P(sT|st)
is separable. Apply two-stage budgeting, P(slT|st, {Bmt}Tt ) does not depend on (skjt, sk jt),
8l 2 Bm, k 2 Bn, m 6= n. It is left to show EVT+1(st) is separable.
EVT+1(st) = Â
sT+1
Ep(sT+1)P(sT+1|st)
= Â
sT+1
Â
sT
Ep(sT+1)P(sT+1|sT)P(sT|st).
Then
DEVT+1(sjt, s jt, lT+1)
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=Â
sT
Â
s jT+1
 ⇥
Ep(sjT + lT+1, s jT+1) Ep(sjT, s jT)
⇤
P(s jT+1|sT)
 
P(sT|st),
where lT+1 indicates new store l opened in period T + 1, and l 2 Pm. Ep(sjT + lT+1, s jT+1)
and Ep(sjT, s jT) are separable by the separability of the static profit. As a result,
Ep(sjT + lT+1, s jT+1) Ep(sjT, s jT) = Ep(sjmT + lT+1, s jmT+1) Ep(sjmT, s jmT),
where sjmT = {shjT|h 2 Pm}, and s jmT = {sh jT|h 2 Pm}. Note
P(s jT+1|sT, BmT+1)
= P

Ep(sjT+1, s jT+1) Ep(sjT+1, s jT)   maxs0 jT+1
⇣
Ep(sjT+1, s0 jT+1) Ep(sjT+1, s0 jT)
⌘
|BmT+1
 
,
where sjT+1 = sjT + lT+1, and s0 jT+1 2 {s jT+1|s jT+1 = s jT + hT+1, h 2 Pm},
= P

Ep(sjmT+1, s jmT+1) Ep(sjmT+1, s jmT)   maxs0 jmT+1
⇣
Ep(sjmT+1, s jmT+1) Ep(sjmT+1, s0 jmT)
⌘  
,
where sjmT+1 = sjmT + lT+1. Thus Âs jT+1
⇥⇥
Ep(sjT + lT+1, s jT+1) Ep(sjT, s jT)
⇤
P(s jT+1|sT)
⇤
is additively separable in {P1, · · · , PM}. Since EVT(st) is separable,
DEVT+1(sjt, s jt, lT+1)
DEVT+1(sjt, s jt, hT+1)
?(skjt, sk jt)|{(Bjmt, B jmt)T+1t=1 },
8l, h 2 Pm, and k 2 Pn, m 6= n.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Simulation method for computing standard errors
In this section, I describe how the first stage estimation error and second stage clustering
error can be accounted for in the standard errors of the structural estimate in the third stage.
It is a simulation method and has four steps.
1. Denote bˆ and f (bˆ) the estimated demand parameter and its distribution from the first
stage estimation. Take R draws of bˆ, {bˆr}Rr=1, from f (bˆ).
2. Recompute market divisions using the clustering algorithm described in Section 1.3.3.5
for a given bˆr. Denote the market divisions by {Pr1, · · · PrM}.
3. Given demand estimate bˆr and market division {Pr1, · · · PrM}, estimate the structural
model to get (yˆr, aˆr) and its distribution f (yˆr, aˆr).
4. Repeat the previous two steps R times and compare f (yˆr, aˆr) to see if the first stage
and second stage errors have an impact on the standard errors of (yˆr, aˆr).
Note the clustering error in the second stage is treated as a machine error. To properly
account for the clustering error, one would need model store locations on random field.
This is an interesting direction for future research.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Given Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, Theorem 2.6 in Newey and McFad-
den (1994) implies the first result. To prove the second result, let r(x, q) = E[y(Yi,Xi, q)|Xi =
x]. Notice that E[r(Xi, qpop)] = 0. Therefore, qcond(X) can be thought of as an extremum
estimator that minimizes  
1
N
N
Â
i=1
r(Xi, q)
!0 
1
N
N
Â
i=1
r(Xi, q)
!
.
We will prove qcond(X)  qpop p! 0 by showing that Assumption 3.2 also holds if we replace
y(Yi,Xi, q) with r(Xi, q). Because E[r(Xi, q)] = E[y(Yi,Xi, q)] it follows that part (i) in
Assumption 2 holds also with r(Xi, q) replacing y(Yi,Xi, q). Part (ii) of Assumption 2 follows
from dominated convergence because, by Assumption 2(iii), E[supq2Q ky(Yi,Xi, q)k|Xi] < •
with probability one. To prove that part (iii) holds also after replacing y(Yi,Xi, q) with
r(Xi, q), notice that,
kr(Xi, q)k = kE[y(Yi,Xi, q)|Xi]k  E
⇥ky(Yi,Xi, q)k   Xi⇤,
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because the norm is a convex function by the Triangle Inequality. Therefore,
sup
q2Q
kr(Xi, q)k  sup
q2Q
E
⇥ky(Yi,Xi, q)k   Xi⇤  Eh sup
q2Q
ky(Yi,Xi, q)k
   Xii.
Taking expectations on both sides of the previous equation and using Assumption 3.2(iii),
we obtain E[supq2Q kr(Xi, q)k] < •. Now, Theorem 2.6 in Newey and McFadden (1994)
implies qcond(X)  qpop p! 0 and, therefore, the second result of the theorem. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The first result follows from Theorem 3.4 in Newey and McFadden
(1994).
To prove the second result, we will first establish the joint asymptotic distribution of
p
N(qˆ  qpop) and
p
N(qcond(X)  qpop), and then we use this result to derive the asymptotic
distribution of
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)) =
p
N(qˆ   qpop) 
p
N(qcond(X)  qpop). (C.1.1)
By Assumption 3.3(ii) and (iv) and Lemma 3.6 in Newey and McFadden (1994) we obtain
that, for x in a set of probability one, r(x, q) is continuously differentiable with respect to q
in an open neighborhood N of qpop, with
∂r(x, q)
∂q0
= E

∂y(Yi,Xi, q)
∂q0
   Xi = x  .
Notice that
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0y(Yi,Xi, qpop) = E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]
+ (y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi])0(y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi])
+ 2E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi](y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]).
Taking expectation eliminates the cross-product term, which implies:
E
⇥kr(Xi, qpop)k2⇤  E ⇥ky(Yi,Xi, qpop)k2⇤ < •.
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Using convexity of the norm, we obtain
sup
q2N
    ∂r(x, q)∂q0
      E
"
sup
q2N
    ∂y(Yi,Xi, q)∂q0
        Xi = x
#
.
Taking averages on both sides of the last equation and using Assumption 3.3(iv) we obtain:
E
"
sup
q2N
    ∂r(x, q)∂q0
    
#
< •.
Notice also that
E

∂r(Xi, qpop)
∂q0
 
= E

∂y(Yi,Xi, qpop)
∂q0
 
= G,
which is nonsingular by Assumption 3.3(v).
As a result, Theorem 3.4 in Newey and McFadden (1994) holds for the estimator that
minimizes 0B@ 1N NÂi=1
0B@ y(Yi,Xi, q1)
r(Xi, q2)
1CA
1CA
00B@ 1N NÂi=1
0B@ y(Yi,Xi, q1)
r(Xi, q2)
1CA
1CA
with respect to q1 and q2. Applying Theorem 3.4 of Newey and McFadden (1994), we obtain
p
N
0B@ qˆ   qpop
qcond(X)  qpop
1CA d! N(0, G 1jointVjoint(G 1joint)0),
where Vjoint is equal to0B@ E⇥y(Yi,Xi, qpop)y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0⇤ E⇥E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]⇤
E
⇥
E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]
⇤
E
⇥
E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]
⇤
1CA ,
and
Gjoint =
0B@ G 0
0 G
1CA .
Now, because equation (C.1.1), we obtain,
p
N
 
qˆ   qcond(X)
  d! N(0,Vgmm,cond),
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where Vgmm,cond = G 1Dcond(G 1)0, and
Dcond = E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0
⇤ E⇥E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]⇤
= E
⇥
V(y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi)
⇤
.
⇤
Proof of Corollary 3.1: The result follows directly fromV(y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi) = E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)
y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi] E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi]E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0|Xi]. ⇤
We next state a lemma from Abadie and Imbens (2010) that will be useful in what
follows.
Lemma C.1 (Lemma 1, Abadie and Imbens (2010, page 180)) Suppose that W1,W2, . . . is a
sequence with Wi 2W whereW a compact subset of RK. Then
lim
N!•
1
N
N
Â
i=1
   Wi  W`W(i)   2 = 0.
Lemma C.2 (Average Conditional Moments) Let (Vi,Wi), i = 1, . . . ,N, be a sequence of
independent, identically distributed random variables, with Vi scalar, and with compact support for
Wi. For some positive integer n, and for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, let µp(w) = E[V
p
i |Wi = w] be Lipschitz in
w with constant Cp. Then for all nonnegative k,m such that max(k,m)  n/2,
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)
p ! E
h
E
⇣
Vki
   Wi⌘ ·E⇣Vmi    Wi⌘i .
Proof of Lemma C.2: First we show
E
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)  E
h
E
⇣
Vki
   Wi⌘ ·E⇣Vmi    Wi⌘i
#
= o(1). (C.1.2)
Because Vi and V`W(i) are independent conditional on W = (W1, ...,WN)
0,
E
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)
#
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
n
E
h
Vki ·Vm`W(i)
   Wio
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
n
E(Vki
   W) ·E ⇣Vm`W(i)   W⌘o
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=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
n
E(Vki
   Wi) ·E ⇣Vm`W(i)   W`W(i)⌘o
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
h
µk(Wi) · µm
⇣
W`W(i)
⌘i
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
n
µk(Wi) ·
h
µm(Wi) + µm
⇣
W`W(i)
⌘
  µm(Wi)
io
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E [µk(Wi) · µm(Wi)] +E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
µk(Wi)
h
µm
⇣
W`W(i)
⌘
  µm(Wi)
i)
=
1
N
N
Â
i=1
E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E (Vmi |Wi)
i
+E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
µk(Wi)
h
µm
⇣
W`W(i)
⌘
  µm(Wi)
i)
.
Therefore,      E
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)  E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E (Vmi |Wi)
i#     
=
     E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
µk(Wi)
h
µm
⇣
W`W(i)
⌘
  µm(Wi)
i)     
 E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
|µk(Wi)| ·
   µm ⇣W`W(i)⌘  µm(Wi)   
)
 sup
w
|µk(w)| ·E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Cm
   Wi  W`W(i)   
)
= o(1),
by Lemma C.1 and dominated convergence. This finishes the proof of (C.1.2).
Next, we will show that
E
8<:
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)  E
h
E
⇣
Vki
   Wi⌘ ·E⇣Vmi |Wi⌘i
#29=; = o(1), (C.1.3)
which, together with (C.1.2), proves the claim in the Lemma. First we expand the square:
E
8<:
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)  E
h
E
⇣
Vki
   Wi⌘ ·E⇣Vmi |Wi⌘i
#29=;
= E
8<:
"
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)
#29=;+ nE hE ⇣Vki |Wi⌘ ·E (Vmi |Wi)io2
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 2E
(
1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i) ·E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E (Vmi |Wi)
i)
By (C.1.2), this is equal to
E
24 1
N
N
Â
i=1
Vki ·Vm`W(i)
!235  nE hE⇣Vki |Wi⌘ ·E⇣Vmi |Wi⌘io2 + o(1)
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
E
h
V2ki ·V2m`W(i)
i
+
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
i
(C.1.4)
 
n
E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E
⇣
Vmi |Wi
⌘io2
+ o(1).
Consider the first term in (C.1.4). Using the independence of Vi and V`W(i) conditional on W
we have
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
E
h
V2ki ·V2m`W(i)
i
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
E
h
E
h
V2ki |Wi
i
·E
h
V2m`W(i)|W`W(i)
ii
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
E
h
µ2k(Wi) · µ2m(W`W(i))
i
 C
N
,
because the terms are bounded by the Lipschitz condition on µp(x) for all p at least equal
to 2k and 2m. Therefore the first term in (C.1.4) is o(1), and the entire expression is
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
i
 
n
E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E
⇣
Vmi |Wi
⌘io2
+ o(1). (C.1.5)
We write the expectation of the first term conditional on W as
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
h
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
   Wii
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i,`W(i) 6=j,`W(j) 6=i
E
h
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
   Wii
+
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i,`W(i)=j or `W(j)=i
E
h
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
   Wii .
The number of terms in the second sum is limited by the “kissing number” the number
of units a given unit can be the closest match for (Miller et al., 1997, see also Abadie and
Imbens, 2008a), which depends on the dimension of Wi. Let the kissing number be denoted
by L. Then, for given i there is only one j such that `W(i) = j, and at most L j such that
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`W(j) = i. With each term in the second sum bounded by E[Vm+ki |Wi] ·E[Vm+ki |Wi], which
is bounded, the second sum is bounded by
E

L
N
·E[Vm+ki |Wi]2
 
= o(1).
Hence
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
h
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
   Wii
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i,`W(i) 6=j,`W(j) 6=i
E
h
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
   Wii+ o(1)
=
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i,`W(i) 6=j,`W(j) 6=i
E
n
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E
⇣
Vm`W(i)|W`W(i)
⌘
E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vm`W(j)|W`W(j)
⌘o
+ o(1).
(C.1.6)
Because of the Lipschitz condition on µp(w) = E[V
p
i |Wi = w] it follows that   E ⇣Vki |Wi⌘E ⇣Vm`W(i)|W`W(i)⌘E ⇣Vkj |Wj⌘E ⇣Vm`W(j)|W`W(j)⌘
 E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E (Vmi |Wi)E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vmj |Wj
⌘   
 C ·max
i
kWi  W`W(i)k ·maxj kWj  W`W(j)k,
which goes to zero by Lemma A.1. Hence (C.1.6) is
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i,`W(i) 6=j,`W(j) 6=i
E
n
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E (Vmi |Wi)E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vmj |Wj
⌘o
+ o(1). (C.1.7)
Next we show that this is equal to
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
n
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E (Vmi |Wi)E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vmj |Wj
⌘o
+ o(1). (C.1.8)
The difference between (C.1.7) and (C.1.8) is
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j|j=i or `W(i)=j, or `W(j)=i
E
n
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E (Vmi |Wi)E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vmj |Wj
⌘o
. (C.1.9)
All terms in this sum are bounded by the Lipschitz condition. By the bound on the kissing
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number and the boundedness of the expectations, it follows that (C.1.9) is o(1). Next,
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
n
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
E (Vmi |Wi)E
⇣
Vkj |Wj
⌘
E
⇣
Vmj |Wj
⌘o
=
n
E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E
⇣
Vmi |Wi
⌘io2
+ o(1),
and thus
1
N2
N
Â
i=1
Â
j 6=i
E
h
Vki V
m
`W(i)V
k
j V
m
`W(j)
i
 
n
E
h
E
⇣
Vki |Wi
⌘
·E
⇣
Vmi |Wi
⌘io2
+ o(1) = o(1),
by (C.1.2). This finishes the proof of (C.1.3), and thus the claim in the lemma. ⇤
Lemma C.3 (Average Conditional Variances) Let (Vi,Wi), i = 1, . . . ,N, be a random
sample from the distribution of (V,W) where (V,W) are a pair of random vectors, with compact
support for Wi. Suppose that µp(w) = E[V
p
i |Wi = w] is Lipschitz in w with constant Cp for p  4.
Define bVcond = 12N NÂi=1
⇣
Vi  V`W(i)
⌘ ⇣
Vi  V`W(i)
⌘0
.
Then: bVcond p ! E [V(Vi|Wi)] . (C.1.10)
Proof of Lemma C.3: To prove bVcond p ! E [V(Vi|Wi)], we show
E
nbVcond  E [V(Vi|Wi)]o2 = o(1).
Without loss of generality we focus on the case with V scalar:
bVcond = 12N NÂi=1
⇣
Vi  V`W(i)
⌘2
=
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
V2i +
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
V2`W(i)  
1
N
N
Â
i=1
ViV`W(i),
and
E [V(Vi|Wi)] = E
n
E
 
V2i
  Wi   [E (Vi|Wi)]2o = E ⇥V2i ⇤ E hE (Vi|Wi)2i .
Because ÂNi=1V2i /N
p ! E[V2i ] by the law of large numbers, it is sufficient to show
1
N
N
Â
i=1
V2`W(i)
p ! E ⇥V2i ⇤ , and 1N NÂi=1Vi ·V`W(i) p ! E
h
E (Vi|Wi)2
i
. (C.1.11)
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The first part of (C.1.11) follows from applying Lemma C.2 with k = 0 and m = 2, and the
second part follows from applying Lemma C.2 with k = m = 1. ⇤
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Since qˆ
p ! qpop and y(Yi,Xi, q) is differentiable in q, Gˆ p ! G by
the law of large numbers. Then it is sufficient to show Dˆcond
p ! Dcond. Define
D˜cond =
1
2N
N
Â
i=1
⇣
y(Yi,Xi, qcond)  y(Y`X(i),X`X(i), qcond)
⌘ ⇣
y(Yi,Xi, qcond)  y(Y`X(i),X`X(i), qcond)
⌘0
.
Let Vi = y(Yi,Xi, qcond), and Wi = Xi. By Lemma C.3, D˜cond
p ! V  y(Yi,Xi, qpop) .
Because qˆ
p ! qpop and y(Yi,Xi, q) is differentiable in q, it follows that Dˆcond   D˜cond p ! 0.
Therefore, bVgmm,cond = Gˆ 1Dˆcond(Gˆ0) 1 p ! G 1Dcond(G0) 1 = Vgmm,cond. ⇤
C.2 Asymptotic Distribution without Differentiability
Let
gˆN(q) =
1
N
N
Â
i=1
y(Yi,Xi, q),
g0(q) = E[y(Yi,Xi, q)],
and
hˆN(q) =
1
N
N
Â
i=1
r(Xi, q).
Assumption C.1 (i) kgˆN(qˆ)k2  infq2Q kgˆN(q)k2+ op(1/N) and khˆN(q(X))k2  infq2Q khˆN(q)k2+
op(1/N); (ii) g0(q) is differentiable at qpop with non-singular derivative G = ∂g0(qpop)/∂q0; (iii)
qpop is an interior point ofQ; (iv)E[ky(Yi,Xi, qpop)k2] < •; (v) for all dN ! 0, supkq qpopkdN
p
N
kgˆN(q)  gˆN(qpop)  g0(q)k p! 0.
Theorem C.1 Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3 and C.1,
p
N(qˆ   qpop) d! N (0, G 1Dpop(G 1)0),
where Dpop = E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)y(Yi,Xi, qpop)0] and
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)) d! N (0, G 1Dcond(G 1)0),
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where Dcond = E[V(y(Yi,Xi, qpop)|Xi)].
Proof: The first result follows from Assumption 3 and Theorem 7.2 in Newey and
McFadden (1994).
To prove the second result, we will first establish the joint asymptotic distribution of
p
N(qˆ  qpop) and
p
N(qcond(X)  qpop), and then we use this result to derive the asymptotic
distribution of
p
N(qˆ   qcond(X)).
Let h0(q) = E[r(Xi, q)]. Because h0(q) = g0(q), Assumption C.1(ii) also holds with h0(q)
replacing g0(q). By Assumption C.1(iv) and the same argument as in the proof of Theorem
3.2, we obtain Ekr(Xi, qpop)k2 < •.
Next, we will show that Assumption C.1(v) also holds with hˆN replacing gˆN and h0
replacing g0. Notice that      1pN
N
Â
i=1
r(Xi, q)  r(Xi, qpop) E
⇥
r(Xi, q)
⇤     
=
      1pN
N
Â
i=1
E
h
y(Yi,Xi, q)  y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, q)
⇤    Xii
     
 E
"      1pN
N
Â
i=1
 
y(Yi,Xi, q)  y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, q)
⇤          X
#
.
Therefore,
sup
kq qpopkdN
      1pN
N
Â
i=1
r(Xi, q)  r(Xi, qpop) E
⇥
r(Xi, q)
⇤     
 E
"
sup
kq qpopkdN
      1pN
N
Â
i=1
 
y(Yi,Xi, q)  y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, q)
⇤          X
#
.
By Markov’s inequality, to show that the right hand side of last equation converges to zero
in probability, it is enough to show that its expectation converges to zero:
E
"
sup
kq qpopkdN
      1pN
N
Â
i=1
 
y(Yi,Xi, q)  y(Yi,Xi, qpop) E
⇥
y(Yi,Xi, q)
⇤      
#
! 0.
Last equation holds by Lemma 2.3.11 in Van Der Vaart and Wellner (1996). The rest of the
proof is as for Theorem 3.2.
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C.3 Application to quantile regression
Let FY|X=x(y) = Pr(Yi  y|Xi = x). For quantile regression:
y(Yi,Xi, q) = Xi(I[Yi X0iq0]   t),
and
r(Xi, q) = Xi(FY|X=Xi(X
0
iq)  t)
for some t 2 (0, 1).
Assume that EkXik < • and that I[Yi X0iq0] is continuous at each q 2 Q with probability
one. Define qpop such that E[y(Yi,Xi, qpop)] = 0 and assume that this equation has a unique
solution. Then, Theorem 1 implies:
p
N(qˆ   qpop) p! 0 and
p
N(qˆ   q(X)) p! 0.
Next we verify the Assumptions of Theorem C.1. For the quantile regression estimator,
it can be shown:       1N NÂi=1Xi(I[YiX0i qˆ]   t)
      = op(1/pN)
(see Powell, 1984). Notice that g0(q) = E[Xi(FY|X=Xi(X
0
iq)  t)]. Let B be an open neigh-
borhood of qpop. Assume that for almost all x in the support of Xi the function FY|X=x(y)
is continuously differentiable for all y = x0q such that q 2 B, with bounded derivative
fY|X=x(x0q). Now if E[kXik2] < •, this implies (see, e.g., Lemma 3.6 in Newey and
McFadden (1994)):
G = E[ fY|X=Xi(X
0
iqpop)XiX
0
i ].
Assume that G is non-singular. E[kXik2] < • also implies E
⇥ky(Yi,Xi, qpop)k2⇤ < •.
Assumption 3(v) is left to be verified. First, notice that each component of y(y, x, q) is
Euclidean for the envelope max{kxk, 1}, as defined in Pakes and Pollard (1987). Because
E[kXik2] < •, this envelope is square-integrable. Because I[Yi X0iq0] is continuous with
probability one at q = qpop, Lemma 2.17 in Pakes and Pollard (1987) implies:
sup
kq qpopkdN
p
NkgˆN(q)  gˆN(qpop)  g0(q)k p! 0.
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As a result, we obtain that Theorem 3.2 holds with
Dpop = E[Xi(I[Yi X0iqpop0]   t)2X0i ],
and
Dcond = E[XiV(I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi)X0i ].
Under correct specification, E[I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi] = t, so V(I[Yi X0iq0]|Xi) = E[(I[Yi X0iq0]  
t)2|Xi] = t(1  t) and Dcond = Dpop.
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